

Pakistan's Diplomatic Ties with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Tehseena Masood¹ and Ghulam Mustafa²

Article Information		Abstract
Received:	October 14, 2024	The research is about the Pakistan's diplomatic ties with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Pakistan and North Korea accepted diplomatic relations in May 1971. The relationship between the two countries has been affected by political and strategic compensation, including cooperation in the defence and technology section. There has been a phase of both close collaboration and strained ties. The bond between Pakistan and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has faced challenges due to North Korea's controversial nuclear weapons program and its international isolation. Pakistan's own nuclear program and proliferation concerns have also influenced the dynamics of their diplomatic ties. Pakistan’s diplomatic ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea display a mix of economic collaboration, strategic cooperation, occasional challenges. and global pressures related to nuclear proliferation.
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1 Introduction

Pakistan and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) accepted diplomatic relations in 1971. The two nations had maintained a tremendously low-profile with constrained public records to be had the volume in their interactions. Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is also known as North Korea. North Korea and Pakistan have been buddies for around 40 years. Pakistan provided nuclear technology assistance to North Korea, while North Korea provided Pakistan with missile technology. Pakistan's A.Q. Khan assisted North Korea in developing nuclear weapons. China has Pakistan as an ally. Furthermore, Pakistan and North Korea are allies because of China. China Supports Both of Them. Asia's geopolitical scene has been marked by high levels of tension brought on by an occurrence of threatening words and missile testing by nuclear-armed powers like North Korea and Pakistan.

In line with previous assessments, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has released an unclassified assessment stating that North Korea most likely possesses nuclear weapons that could be delivered by ballistic rockets. Given North Korea's relentless pursuit of nuclear capabilities, the development of such weapons was expected even prior to the regime's first nuclear test that was detected in 2006. North Korea's nuclear power may be larger than earlier thinking due to advancements in nuclear technology and the sharing of nuclear understanding between North Korea, China, and Pakistan. The fact that the North Korean government has been viewed as one of the world's most suppressive authorities, adds to this cause for concern. Beyond that, North Korea's nuclear threats against the United States became more frequent and intense in 2013, which points out the importance for immediate and effective action to eliminate this danger (Schneider, 2014). However, the growing threat presented by North Korea's nuclear capabilities may not be sufficiently addressed by the current U.S. policy, which downplays

¹M.Phil. Scholar, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Faisalabad, Pakistan.

²Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Faisalabad, Pakistan. Corresponding Author. Email: ghulammustafa@gcuf.edu.pk

nuclear deterrence and cuts down on missile defence funding. A thorough and effective plan is desperately needed to lessen the hazards associated with the regime's nuclear weapons, especially considering North Korea's aggressive behaviour and the changing circumstances surrounding nuclear proliferation.

Pressures on the continent have intensified because of recent changes, such as military clashes between China and India, nuclear war warnings from Pakistan against India, and North Korea's repeatedly missile launches. The potential deployment of nuclear technologies in these wars heighten tensions on international level, especially in light of collaboration of countries who are thought to be threatening to the US, including Iraq, Libya, and more recently, Iran (Menon, 2022).

Pakistan and North Korea start working together on missiles. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) is one of the missile research institutes in Pakistan that planned to work with North Korea to come up with the Ghauri missile. The relationships that Khan could have utilized to transmit nuclear technologies are most likely established by this cooperation. However, very little is known regarding the timing of any nuclear transfers, the potential nuclear components that North Korea may have acquired, and whether Khan's activities were known to the Pakistani government. The purpose of this paper is to examine the type and extent of North Korea and Pakistan's cooperation in the development of nuclear and missile weapons. Its objective is to evaluate the effects of this collaboration on their individual WMD programs as well as the wider ramifications for the global non-proliferation regime.

2 Statement of Problem

Pakistan's diplomatic ties with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was a subject of interest and subject inside the global arena. This looks at targets to research the complexities, implications and demanding situations of Pakistan's diplomatic ties with the Korean state. Pakistan and North Korea have collaborated strongly collectively on growing nuclear and ballistic missiles since the 1970s. Pakistan's contribution in UN efforts to diplomatically separate the DPRK has been stopped by its close ties with China and a substantial reflection that linked its military to North Korea's nuclear program. Trade and expertise have contributed to the development of different sectors. These ties have been in large part focused on financial and alternate interests.

3 Research Questions

- How has the diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and North Korea developed since their acceptance?
- How do Pakistan's alliances, economic interests, and security concerns shape its approach to establish relations with North Korea?

4 Significance of the Study

Pakistan's diplomatic relations with North Korea shows how it balances security concerns, economic gains, and strategic flexibility to manage its foreign policy goals. These observations contribute to more fundamental concerns on how these nations navigate rivalry and use their diplomatic connections to advance their own goals. A thorough understanding of the interactions between nuclear proliferation, strategic alliances, economic cooperation, and regional security dynamics can be obtained by investigating Pakistan's diplomatic ties with Koreans. These countries have different socio-cultural and political systems, but they are united by their interest in nuclear technology and power, even if they are near China, a powerful regional force.

5 Literature Review

The study "Pakistan's Diplomatic Ties with Democratic People's Republic of Korea" has been discussed many research papers. The following are the reviews of the examined studies:

In this article “Pakistan-North Korea Relations: An Unexpected Friendship” by Azhar (2023), North Korea's involvement in arming Iran during the Iran-Iraq War raised concerns about Pakistan's possible involvement in North Korea's nuclear development, which prompted the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries in the 1970s. Although ties were improved when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Pyongyang in 1976, difficulties arose since Pakistan had sided with the US during the Soviet Afghan War. North Korea proceeded with its nuclear development with assistance from Pakistan, China, and the USSR. In the 1990s, there were rumours of missile sales and nuclear cooperation between the two nations. The United States placed sanctions on Abdul Qadeer Khan after allegations that he had given North Korea nuclear technology arose. The nature of the link between North Korea and Pakistan remained secret, and General Musharraf refuted accusations. Their relationship's uncertain future reflects the intricate dynamics of world politics and might have an impact on both regional and international security (Azhar, 2023). How the extent of Pakistan's contact with North Korea has changed over time in response to diplomatic pressure and international sanctions is not described here.

This research “What Next for Sanctions Against North Korea?” by Watterson (2019), targeting both the supply and demand sides of this transaction is crucial if the United States is to stop North Korea from trading nuclear and missile capabilities. States are looking for these capabilities on the supply side for security reasons. They could utilize North Korea as a supplier because other governments that have non-proliferation commitments will not do business with them, or because of pre-existing supply lines and interpersonal ties. For instance, decades of earlier commerce in conventional armaments and cooperative connections developed during their backing of Iran in the Iran-Iraq War made it easier for Pakistan to acquire North Korean missile technology in the 1990s and 2000s (Watterson, 2019). This study needs to explore how North Korea continues to operate its supply networks for nuclear and missile technology in the face of international pressure. The weaknesses and inadequacies in the present sanctions system may be revealed by a thorough examination of the networks and methods North Korea uses to obtain the tools and technology it needs.

In this report “Pakistan, North Korea's Mutually Beneficial Ties have long been a Source of Suspicion for West” by Farooq (2017), United States is contemplating further economic penalties against North Korea, as it accuses the nation of "begging for war" following a recent nuclear test. Considering this situation, the enduring diplomatic connections between Pakistan and North Korea, which date back to 1971, are being thoroughly examined by Western powers. This relationship encompasses reciprocal trade agreements, military collaboration, and the exchange of technological advancements. Claims of nuclear technology transfer from Pakistan to North Korea have put strain on Islamabad's relations with its Western allies, resulting in sanctions on establishments such as Khan Research Laboratories. Despite these obstacles, Pakistan has upheld its diplomatic ties with North Korea, urging adherence to United Nations resolutions amidst the current tensions between North Korea and the United States, as well as the endeavours of other nations to promote moderation (Farooq, 2017). I have discussed how the continued hostilities between North Korea and the West especially the United States have impacted Pakistan's foreign policy choices and diplomatic approach that is a gap here.

In this research “The North Korean Nuclear Program in Transition” by Heinonen (2012), according to former Pakistani President General P. Musharraf's memoirs, Pakistan provided North Korea with substantial assistance in the mid-1990s, including centrifuges, special oils, and other equipment. Under a government-to-government agreement, engineers from North Korea received training at A.Q. Khan's Research Laboratories in Kahuta. There is conjecture that during this time, North Korea may have acquired centrifuge plans from the A.Q. Khan network. North Korea tried to get vacuum technology in 2002, indicating that they intended to concentrate on getting more uranium enrichment equipment. Based mostly on the Pakistani P-2 centrifuge design, information from the late 1990s and early 2000s indicated North Korea's goal of achieving a semi-industrial-scale enriching capacity. Materials such as high-strength aluminium in 2002/2003 and maraging steel in 1997 were purchased, suggesting an intention to create a HEU manufacturing scheme that may require as many as 5900 centrifuges. The sequence and composition of the North Korean, Iranian, and Libyan acquisitions via the A.Q. Khan

network point to a concerted endeavour to get enrichment technology beginning in 1987 (Heinonen, 2012). The gap is that how have regional and international security dynamics, especially in East Asia and the Middle East, been affected by the acquisition of nuclear technology and materials from the A.Q. Khan network.

In this study “How A.Q. Khan Helped Distort America’s DPRK Policy” by Lewis (2010), A.Q. Khan claimed that North Korea had displayed three nuclear weapons is probably a fabrication or an exaggeration made for personal gain. It appeared to be an attempt to suggest that his acts had no negative impact on Pakistan and that North Korea was already in possession of nuclear weapons prior to Khan's involvement. Although the New York Times did not take down the item, it is important to note that David Sanger expressed questions about the assertion in July 2005, citing several experts in the US intelligence community. Renowned expert on North Korea's nuclear program Siegfried Hecker stressed that A.Q. Khan claimed was a ploy to avoid taking responsibility for what he had done. He implied that Khan intended to downplay the significance of his aid to North Korea by claiming that they were already in possession of nuclear weapons. Siegfried Hecker pointed out that Khan was using this as a handy technique to hide his role in the spread of nuclear technology (Lewis, 2010). There remains a gap in understanding the motivations behind the public statements and the implications for Pakistan's role in nuclear technology transfer to North Korea.

6 Early Interactions and Diplomatic Exchanges

A.Q. Khan became a national hero after playing a crucial part in leading Pakistan's atomic weapons development and receiving great praise from the people. But this reputation also gave him the confidence to carry out illegal operations, most notably the shady transfer of nuclear technology, know-how, and equipment to foreign nations. A.Q. Khan began his business by sending Iran centrifuges, blueprints, and other parts in the late 1980s. He then extended his activities to include nations like Syria and Iraq. North Korea and Libya have been part of his clients by the year 2000.

Pakistan looked itself in a financial disaster by the middle of the 1990s. At this moment, the first concrete evidence that A.Q. Khan was supplying the North Koreans with nuclear techniques started to come out. A.Q. Khan is said to have made 13 trips to North Korea and seems to have suggested a barter agreement in which Pakistan would give North Korea ballistic missiles equipped with uranium-enrichment technology in exchange for funding (Laufer, 2005). After that, some of the equipment was flown by Pakistani military planes, whose flights were approved by Pakistani air controllers.

It was revealed by a British journalist and writer Shyam Bhatia after the death of Benazir Bhutto, that Bhutto brought up the visit from North Korea in 2003 while talking about her issues with Pakistan's military. She said, "Let me tell you something," and then instructed Bhatia to switch off his tape recorder. "I have done more for my country than all the military chiefs of Pakistan combined. She looked for an overcoat with the 'deepest possible pockets' before leaving Islamabad, into which she inserted CDs with the technical information the North Koreans need on nuclear enrichment, with aim of taking CDs with North Korea's missile data back with her on the trip back.

Pakistan suffered much and was greatly embarrassed by the information disclosed by retired General Pervez Musharraf in his 2006 memoirs about Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's transfer of critical nuclear material to North Korea. During a meeting of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, a Foreign Office official acknowledged the seriousness of the issue and highlighted Pakistan's defensive response to the disclosure. Foreign diplomats responded with mistrust and surprise to the Foreign Office's forced reiteration of Pakistan's unwavering position against nuclear proliferation.

7 Evolution of Diplomatic Ties Over Time

The December 1993 went of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to Pyongyang to be an important turning point in the growing ties between North Korea and Pakistan. There's a lot of discussions about

Bhutto's trip's objective and the type of agreements attained. Even though Bhutto maintained that just money was transferred Pakistani money was exchanged for North Korean missile technology the existence of comprehensive designs for a Rodong missile points to a more extensive degree of cooperation. This visit demonstrated the strategic value that both countries put on developing their nuclear technological capabilities, in addition to laying the foundation for future collaboration. This partnership would grow over time, going beyond missile technology into more expansive domains of nuclear research and development. Notwithstanding the secrecy surrounding these transactions, the worldwide community would be affected, leading to worries about the stability of international security arrangements and the spread of nuclear weapons (Chinoy, 2021).

To counterbalance India's missile superiority, Pakistani military commanders desperately sought ballistic missile technology, which they received in exchange for precise knowledge regarding uranium enrichment. Regarding its alleged secret uranium enrichment program, North Korea was directly confronted by the United States in October 2002. The Agreed Framework collapsed, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and foreign inspectors were driven out because of this critical conflict (Mian, 2014). At this time, Pakistan was identified by US intelligence services as North Korea's main source of uranium enrichment technology. According to media sources, Pakistan may have even exchanged nuclear enrichment technology for North Korea's help in creating longer-range missiles.

In his response to the charges made against Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Musharraf delves deeper into the complex dynamics of Pakistan's nuclear involvement, illuminating both the specifics of Khan's contributions and the larger picture of Pakistan's nuclear program. Although Khan did provide North Korea with centrifuges and designs, Musharraf argues that these transfers did not substantially increase North Korea's capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Rather, he emphasizes Khan's specific role in uranium enrichment, implying a narrow scope in the nuclear weaponization process.

Musharraf, however, draws a clear distinction between Khan's contributions and downplays his significance in other crucial aspects of producing bombs, like delivery methods and trigger mechanisms, while highlighting his proficiency in uranium enrichment. Musharraf strongly refutes rumours that suggest technology transfers between Pakistan and North Korea, highlighting Pakistan's commitment to preserving the integrity of its nuclear weapons (Dawn, 2005).

Apart from his statements regarding North Korea, Musharraf verifies Khan's trips to Mali to discuss uranium technology with Libyan authorities, which puts Pakistan's dealings in the context of the international nuclear arena. Musharraf navigates the difficulties of nuclear proliferation charges with his thorough response, offering insights into Pakistan's nuclear policies and its interactions with foreign entities. Although official remarks from the US clearly acknowledge that Pakistan and North Korea did collaborate in some capacity, important information about the scope of this cooperation and the role played by Pakistan's government is still missing. President Musharraf of Pakistan admitted the transfer of nuclear technology in 2006, while both North Korea and Pakistan had previously denied any such transfers (Squassoni, 2006).

In August 2016, Syed Tariq Fatemi a Special Assistant to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Foreign Affairs, went on a diplomatic visit to Belarus as well as Kazakhstan. The objective of this four-day tour was to attain corporation for Pakistan's application join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a global association concerned to nuclear non-proliferation. Taking their constant opposing to nuclear proliferation into account, Pakistan's diplomatic endeavours should strategically concentrate on Belarus and Kazakhstan. Given that Pakistan's regional adversary, India, was also aggressively pursuing NSG membership, this step was very noteworthy. Pakistan wants to allay fears that terrorist organizations may acquire its nuclear weapons. This is the driving force behind its application to join the NSG. Pakistan intended to have gateway to civilian nuclear technology and fuel as well as accentuate its reputation as a secure nuclear power by joining the NSG. Nonetheless, Pakistan's aims to join the NSG were enormously impeded by its alliance with North Korea. North Korea and Pakistan have collaborated densely together to grow nuclear and ballistic missile technology since the 1970s. Pakistan's ties with

other nations have been constrained because of this collaboration, which has provoked stresses about proliferation warnings among the international community (Ramani, 2016). Pakistan's partnership with North Korea has hampered its efforts to link with international initiatives aimed at separating the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), even though China has strongly assisted Pakistan's NSG candidacy. Furthermore, Pakistan's diplomatic stance on the affair has been made more difficult by an earlier disagreement that linked the country's military to North Korea's nuclear programme.

8 Diplomatic Challenges and Cooperation

The complicated issues behind Pakistan's role in North Korea's nuclear development and the wider implications for world security are clarified by Pervez Hoodbhoy's thoughts. Hoodbhoy highlights that although Pakistan has historically given centrifuge technology to North Korea, Pyongyang's goal is centred on plutonium, whereas Pakistan's strategy is centred on uranium. The fact that nuclear shipments stopped in 2003 when A.Q. Khan was apprehended emphasizes how the mechanics of nuclear proliferation are dynamic. Hoodbhoy's claim that Khan probably wasn't acting alone begs the issue of how deeply Pakistan's elite was complicit, implying the necessity of in-depth inquiries and accountability protocols. The technology transfers in which Pakistan received missiles in return highlights the complex network of strategic considerations and reciprocal advantages that underpins these kinds of deals. Furthermore, Hoodbhoy's doubts about the A.Q. Khan network's survival speak to larger worries about the viability of covert nuclear proliferation networks at a time of increased international monitoring and surveillance. But in order to successfully reduce dangers, countries must continue to work together and exercise constant vigilance due to the dynamic character of nuclear proliferation concerns (DW, 2017). Hoodbhoy rejects popular narratives of "rogue states" propagated by nuclear-armed nations by pushing for a more fair and nuanced approach to global security governance and by supporting the admission of North Korea as a nuclear power. In the end, Hoodbhoy's study makes a strong case for a more inclusive and morally grounded strategy for dealing with the complex issues raised by nuclear proliferation in the twenty-first century.

After Washington sanctioned Pakistan for its nuclear weapons development in the 1990s, A.Q. Khan was charged by the United States of selling nuclear secrets to North Korea and neighbouring Iran. During the ten-year Soviet occupation of neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan was verified by successive U.S. presidents to not be building nuclear weapons.

The complex dynamics of nuclear proliferation in the area were further complicated by the charges made against Pakistan about the purported sale of nuclear weapons technology to North Korea in return for nuclear-capable No-Dong missiles. The difficulty of finding the beginnings of Pakistan's nuclear interaction with North Korea was highlighted by a 2003 Congressional Research Report, which hypothesized that this covert alliance most likely began in the middle of the 1990s. The international community expressed many worries over the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential consequences for regional and global security following the revealing of these agreements between North Korea and Pakistan (npr, 2021).

In the past, North Korea and Pakistan have both denied any formal role in the transfer of nuclear technology. However, Pakistan's indirect involvement especially through Dr. Khan's private network has been shown by a number of intelligence reports, leaked papers, and investigations. Pakistan and North Korea are thought to have collaborated on missile development in addition to nuclear technologies. This partnership involves the sharing of missile technology and expertise, which enhances North Korea's nuclear warhead transportation capabilities and supports its nuclear aspirations.

9 Military Cooperation and Defence Collaboration

Historical developments and geopolitical considerations play a major role in the complex connection that exists between North Korea and Pakistan over the development of nuclear weapons. The first steps toward cooperation were taken during the visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to North

Korea in 1976, which is considered the origin of this relationship. But this collaboration really took off in the 1990s, propelled by Pakistan's determination to get nuclear delivery systems despite international pressure and prohibitions.

The extent of the coordination between Pyongyang and Islamabad was highlighted by the public disclosure of their missile cooperation in the wake of Pakistan's domestic No-dong missile test in April 1998, known as 'Ghauri'. Driven by similar strategic interests and mutual advantage, Pakistan and North Korea continued to cooperate despite persistent efforts by the US and other international agencies to weaken this relationship (Mirza, 2014). This long-lasting partnership between two countries that on the surface appear to be at odds with one another emphasizes the intricacies of geopolitical dynamics and the extent governments will go to protect their strategic interests. It also emphasizes the difficulties the international community has in controlling and mitigating proliferation dangers in a world growing more linked by the day.

As the person who was founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan faced imprisonment in 2004 for his primary assistance in the shipping of nuclear technology and supplies to other countries, including Libya, North Korea, Iran, and possibly others. A.Q. Khan's nuclear shipping exchange was working in over 20 countries during the 1980s and 1990s, using a network of mediators and businesses to centralized transactions. Depending on the complexity and size of the transaction, the secret network provided a wide range of technological knowledge and supplies at rates ranging from millions to hundreds of millions of dollars. Even though the network operated at a high level of expertise, years of thorough intelligence gathering by the US and the UK made its disclosure inevitable (MacCalman, 2016).

10 International Concern and Controversies

The international community is now more concerned about nuclear proliferation and the complex networks that enable it because of the A.Q. Khan network's actions being made public. The Khan network's wide-ranging activities were highlighted by a U.N. nuclear watchdog assessment, which accused it of operating in a startling 12 nations and smuggling nuclear weaponization designs to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. The State Department released a statement that further highlighted the seriousness of these findings. Khan and his collaborators were instrumental in supplying Iran and Libya with centrifuge designs, parts, and in some cases, entire centrifuges (Pleming, 2009). The complex web of networks that enable nuclear proliferation presents serious threats to international security and stability, as demonstrated by the A.Q. Khan network. There is an urgent need for increased awareness, collaboration, and strong steps to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology to rogue states or non-state actors as nations deal with the fallout from such revelations. The story of A.Q. Khan serves as an alarming example of the ongoing danger that covert nuclear networks pose and the necessity of taking coordinated action to prevent their spread.

A.Q. Khan network proliferation operations were addressed with a major step in 2009, when the Department of State announced sanctions. This decision, which comes after a protracted study by the US government, demonstrates the country's dedication to fully examining and addressing risks of nuclear proliferation (U.S Department of State, 2009). These penalties have several uses. Firstly, by focusing on particular people and organizations connected to the A.Q. Khan network, they hope to discourage further proliferation-related actions. The sanctions serve as a deterrent to potential proliferators by making it evident that such acts will not be permitted and by exacting repercussions for their behaviour.

The A.Q. Khan network's operations point out the critical risks that covert proliferation networks position. North Korea also benefited from centrifuge designs, technology, and equipment, while Iran and Libya obtained centrifuge designs, parts, and even entire centrifuges. Furthermore, Libya was given nuclear weapon designs, which allowed other nations to avoid the several phases of developing nuclear weapons. To lessen the proliferation threat posed by the materials obtained from the A.Q. Khan

network, the United States removed them when Libya decided to surrender its nuclear program in 2004. This emphasizes how critical it is for nations to work together to destroy networks that promote nuclear proliferation and stop the spread of nuclear weapons technology.

Deep worries about nuclear proliferation and Pakistan's role in it have been voiced by the US, UN, and other international powers. Following the disclosure of Dr. Khan's network in the early 2000s, Pakistan was subject to severe international criticism and sanctions, mainly from the United States and European nations. Pakistan has consistently insisted that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and self-defence, especially in light of its competition with India, even if it formally asserts that it has complied with non-proliferation accords. The proliferation connections to Iran, North Korea, and other nations, however, point to a more nuanced reality. Both Pakistan and North Korea were subject to international scrutiny when allegations of nuclear collaboration with North Korea surfaced. Pakistan is subject to limitations on specific forms of trade and technology transfer, and the United Nations and other international organisations have persisted in monitoring and addressing the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The security and stability of the world are affected by Pakistan and North Korea's sharing of nuclear technology. The dangers of nuclear escalation, especially in unstable areas like South and East Asia, have raised concerns about both nations' nuclear programs. In a world already worried about the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable regimes, Pakistan's role in proliferation makes international attempts to stop the development of nuclear weapons even more difficult. Pakistan has occasionally experienced diplomatic isolation as a result of its backing of North Korea's nuclear aspirations, especially from Western nations. Pakistan has been under pressure to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but this has frequently been made more difficult by the nation's own strategic objectives and its close ties with China, which has its own nuclear policy

11 Conclusion

1971, Pakistan and North Korea have maintained diplomatic links; nevertheless, in comparison to other international relationships, their interactions are less extensive and noticeable. Historical concerns have included the participation of the A.Q. Khan network in the spread of nuclear weapons. As a result, Pakistan has come to enforce from other countries to keep up its non-proliferation agreements. Due to the imposing of international sanctions against North Korea, trade between Pakistan and North Korea has been reduced.

To sum up, mutual assistance in nuclear and missile technologies has been an essential component of North Korea and Pakistan's alliance for the last forty years of history. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan played a vital role in serving North Korea to produce nuclear weapons, and North Korea supplies Pakistan with missile technology. The two countries have benefited from their strong relations with China, a powerful regional player that backs them both. The nuclear aspirations of these nations have had a substantial impact on the geopolitical environment of Asia, which has led to increased tensions. North Korea and Pakistan have a shared interest in nuclear technology despite having different sociocultural and political systems. This tie is further reinforced by their strategic alliance with China. North Korea presents a serious threat to the world due to its developing nuclear capabilities, as demonstrated by its ability to launch ballistic missiles, especially considering its authoritarian government and hostile approach. The prospect that North Korea's nuclear stockpile is larger than previously thought, possibly because of technology transfers involving China and Pakistan, has been brought up by the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). Given that the current U.S. policy may not adequately handle the growing risk posed by North Korea's nuclear developments, this circumstance necessitates a robust and comprehensive reaction. Recent events, such as the military crisis between China and India, Pakistan's nuclear threats against India, and North Korea's missile launches, highlight the critical demand for practical nuclear conflict prevention plans. The strength of the cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea is indicated by the Ghauri missile development project, which was handled by Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). Questions concerning the participation and knowledge of the Pakistani

government in these actions are raised by the lack of clarity surrounding the timing and scope of nuclear transfers between these nations. The purpose of this research is to examine the type and scope of North Korea and Pakistan's cooperation on nuclear and missile technology. It seeks to determine how this union will influence each partner's WMD program as well as its greater consequences for the international non-proliferation strategy.

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