

Comparative Analysis of Democratization in Egypt and Tunisia: Key Factors behind Success and Failure (2011-2020)

Mahnoor Noshewan¹ and Zoonia Naseeb²

Article Information	Abstract
Received: Feb 03, 2026 Revised: June 28, 2026 Accepted: June 29, 2026	This paper critically evaluates the advent of Arab spring on democratization process in Arab world, concentrating mostly in Tunisia and Egypt. In general, this research aims to answer three main research questions: how the Arab spring affected democratization, what are the main reasons for the success of the formation of democracy and what factors led the failure of democratization movements in Egypt. In this paper, comparative results of Arab spring in various countries are provided, and the paper also shows that Tunisia experienced a relative success in formation of a democratic framework, while in Egypt, regression into authoritarianism was the outcome. As opposed to being dominated by the military, the economy is challenged, political cohesion is lacking, and the role of civil society, political pluralism, and international support are key factors in Tunisia, not in Egypt. The outcome of these democracies is important when considering the role of the Arab spring in influencing political transitions. Drawing on this gap, the study considers the political, economic, and social determinants that shaped process of democratization in both countries. Employing a qualitative approach, the research utilizes case studies and document analysis to assess institutional reforms, civil society engagement, and external influences. The findings are to provide insights into the challenges and opportunities for democratization in the region, offering valuable implications for policymakers, scholars, and international organizations. By contributing to the discourse on political transitions in MENA, this research aims to enhance the understanding of democratic consolidation and regression in post-revolutionary states.
Keywords <i>Democratization,</i> <i>Egypt,</i> <i>Middle East,</i> <i>Political pluralism,</i> <i>Tunisia</i>	

1. Introduction

The rise and fall of democratization in the Middle East and North African region present an intriguing narrative marked by aspiration and disillusionment. Recent historical movements, especially the Arab spring, have enlightened the many complexities involved in transiting from authoritarianism to democratic governance. As, (Huntington, 1993) defined a wave of democratization as "a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period".

The failure or inadequacy of embedding an accountable and functioning political system is held to be caused by an embedded political framework, historical background, institutional legacy, and cultural baggage. With the annual data given by freedom house, none of the political systems in the region

¹ BS student of International Relations, University of Central Punjab, Lahore.

² Dr. Zoonia Naseeb (Corresponding Author) is Assistant Professor at School of International Relations Minhaj University Lahore. Email: zoonia_naseeb@yahoo.com

was considered "free" before 2010 (Inmaculada Szmolka, 2015 and Eryilmaz, 2017). The popular uprisings that began in Tunisia and spread throughout the middle east in December 2010 caused mass speculation over whether it was the inauguration of a "fourth wave," the beginning of the end of authoritarian rule in the region. What came so strongly and abruptly in Tunisia followed in Egypt, as the whole world watched the regimes come down. For so long had the people that participated in the Arab spring been denied political and religious freedoms, justice free of corruption, and economic opportunities that it was time for change. (Dunay, 2017).

The Arab uprisings of 2011-2012 popular protests challenging authoritarian rule across the middle east and north Africa took the world by surprise. The possibility that the Arab region might finally be loosening the chains of tyranny was electrifying. But within five years, this hope had largely been dashed. Popular mobilization had left in its wake a political scene littered with state collapse, civil war, and authoritarian regression. This dark turn in the Arab world was bound to happen to pessimists. To others, however, alternative routes were available (Belin, 2015). The growing anti-government demonstrations, revolutions, and armed rebellions in 2011 in the MENA culminated into the "Arab spring". As a result of the Arab spring, four leaders of the region's authoritarian governments have been overthrown: bien Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, Gadhafi in Libya, and Saleh in Yemen. From Yemen to Syria to Morocco and Bahrain, contentious politics and protest movements have spread across the Arab world (Barakat, 2020). Although the two transitions started off similarly, they ended up being quite different, with reasons ranging from economic constraints to lack of camaraderie in constitution building. While these reasons are plausible, they are not mutually exclusive. (Dunay, 2017)

The uprisings in Tunisia were the first in a series of events that made a powerful impression on ordinary people in the region, and as a result it spread like wildfire to its neighbouring countries. The events that took place in Tunisia demonstrated that broad based movements such as the one that overthrew the Tunisia n government was both powerful and effective. Protesters in Egypt subsequently occupied Tahir square in Cairo on 25th January 2011 (Machrouh, 2017). It then locates the structural and agential factors that make a patrolled democracy, such as in Tunisia, successful rather than failed transitions, as seen in the case of Egypt. It argues that bargained pacts can bring about democratization and overcome this contentious cleavage; and that, ultimately, such mutual adaptations between the realms of religion and politics are not alien to the Islamic tradition (Alaoui, 2020). The juxtaposition of Tunisia and Egypt also makes for an elegant, paired comparison. While taking all these differences into consideration with utmost care, these cases offer diametrically contrasting outcomes of successful versus failed paced transitions between Islamist and non-Islamist actors. What makes Tunisia and Egypt different is that before their regime transitions, both qualified as closed autocracies rather than competitive authoritarian regimes (Alaoui, 2020).

2. Historical background

This refers to the series of prodemocracy protests and demonstrations that erupted in the Arab world and is otherwise known as the "Arab spring, " "Arab awakening, " or "Arab uprisings. ". It started in Tunisia in 2010 and then spread to other countries, most notably Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, in 2011. The protesters expressed their political and economic grievances and called for regime change: "The people want to bring down the regime. " Under the increasing pressure of the mass protests, Tunisia n president Zine el abidine ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011; Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011 (Ahmed, 2024).

The Arab Spring highlighted the failure of pan-Arab ism and the rise of narrow nationalism, which hindered democratization efforts. Historical tribal and sectarian divisions contributed to the ongoing struggles for social and economic equality in the region post-Arab spring. (Muhammad, 2024). The Arab uprisings, that shook the MENA region between late 2010 and late 2012, refer to a series of social movements that have destabilized authoritarian governments in the region. The uprisings led to the overthrow of the reigning dictators in crucial MENA countries (E. G., Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and

Yemen) and eruption of civil wars (E. G., Libya, Syria, and Yemen). (Sahin, 2022). The Arab Spring was a turning point in democratization as citizens in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq tried to overthrow autocratic regimes. The results were mixed, with challenges in democratic consolidation, and the outcome led to civil wars and authoritarian retrenchment. (Stephen, 2020). Egypt's transition to democracy failed with the 2013 military coup while the Tunisia n transition had been successful. This is even though revolts in Egypt and Tunisia bore great resemblance with each other during the initial phases.

3. Research Questions

- How did the Arab spring influence the democratization process in Arab world in general and middle east in particular?
- What were the decisive factors in the success of democracy in Tunisia?
- What were the decisive factors for democracy failure in Egypt?

This paper compares the process of democratization in Egypt and Tunisia between 2011 and 2024 to present a critical view of how these two states developed differently due to the results of the Arab spring. This article discusses the critical function of the Arab spring in realizing democratization in the MENA region, dwelling on critical reasons for the difference between democratization in Tunisia, which was successful, and democratization in Egypt, which failed. Both cases are focal to understanding larger trends in democratization in the Arab world.

The first goal of such analysis is to know how the Arab spring sprouted the democratization process throughout the Arab world. This will discuss if the mass uprising of 2011 challenged the traditional authoritarian regimes with spaces for democratic transition in Egypt and Tunisia. Also, this paper measure to what extent this political change catalysed by the Arab spring had sustained after this occurrence. The second is to identify and evaluate the determinants of a successful democratic transition in Tunisia. This article examines to what extent inclusive political institutions, power in civil society, the efforts of national dialogue quartet who mediated, and the adoption of a progressive constitution of 2014 played a role. Additionally, the analysis examines how the political culture of Tunisia, its apparent consensus building of political factions, and international support played a role in bringing about its relatively stable processes of democratization. The third objective will be to investigate the reasons behind deeming the democratization in Egypt a failure. The article examines four reasons which have inhibited Egypt's democratic transition political polarization, the military's hold over politics and suppression of civil liberties, and the inability to establish inclusive institutions. Also, it will be about the return to authoritarianism under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to undo democratic gains. It shall help uncover the dynamics that gave rise to the different democratic outcomes achieved in Egypt and Tunisia, if accomplished. During study, an analysis of political, institutional, social and geopolitical factors will be made to reach at a deeper comprehension of why democracy was successful in Tunisia, but not in Egypt, pointing the way forward with respect to prospects and hurdles of democratization.

4. Literature Review

The very opposite of that is the collapse of an authoritarian regime which is indeed a much more radical and dramatic road to democratization. This happens when popular uprisings or revolutions would have general discontent and social movements that would overthrow the established government, replacing it with a new democratic order. The pathway is high in intensity and high in unpredictability, usually accompanied by great social disruption and the possibility of democracy or chaos depending on the way the transition process is managed (Whitehead, 2002). The second mode of democratization is imposed democracy, where democratic institutions and processes are imposed on a country by external powers such as foreign governments or international organizations. This often is a result of military intervention or occupation, intending to reshape the political order toward democracy. The results of this top-down kind of democracy vary from case to case, with mixed

success, but also suffering from legitimacy and ownership failures that might question the long-run survival of these forms of implantations (Steven levitsky,2005). Incremental democratization occurs after an extended, step-by-step extension of political rights and civil liberties. This trajectory does not attempt to jump at sudden or sensational changes but works on gradual change that builds a step-by-step foundation for democracy. It has been viewed as a stable form of democratization especially in scenarios where rapid change can destabilize established institutions (Stephan haggard, 2016). Democratization from below is often characterized by the grassroots mobilization of civil society organizations, social movements, and communities at the grassroots level demanding democratic reform and creating one. This bottom-up approach depends on active citizenry to bring about the change and illustrates the effectiveness of collective action in the politics of change. In contrast, democratization from above is a process led by ruling elites or political leaders as they chart a course towards democratization. Sometimes, it's a power-strategic ploy to continue ruling, a move to boost legitimacy, or just to survive new political reality. Together, these pathways show how societies can pursue democratization in many ways, often involving complex and sometimes difficult processes. (Merkel, 2014).

The Arab Spring serves as a compelling case study of democratization, showcasing how different pathways including peaceful transitions, grassroots mobilization, and the overthrow of authoritarian regimes played out across the Middle east and north Africa, particularly in countries like Egypt and Tunisia.

5. Influence of Arab spring on Democratization of Arab World

The Arab Spring greatly marked the democratization agenda of the Arab world especially the middle east as protested massively through demanding proper democratic rule. The movement began in Tunisia in 2010 and then spread to countries such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen before the fall of several long-standing authoritarian regimes (Abushouk, 2024). Despite these challenges the transition towards democracy has been difficult. For instance, the revolt of Egypt's Arab spring demonstrated how the historical, sociopolitical, and way of life factors had impacted in the progression of democracy, hence, it requires structural upgrade and inclusion political cooperation for long haul transcend of the worldwide democratization (Colette, & Mika, 2024).

5.1 Direct impact on democratization

The Arab Spring mobilized millions of citizens across the various countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Social media played a crucial.

This mobilization role meant that individuals could freely use social platforms to plan protests, gather information, and bring consciousness about their demands for democracy and human rights (Azab, 2023).

5.2 Overthrowing regimes

The protests led to the ousting of long-term leaders such as Zine el abidine ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. In this way, the demonstrations became a force and inspired movements that spread throughout many other countries as well, signalling the region as a possibility of change (Bank & Busse, 2021).

5.3 Political reforms

In a few countries, the first wave of protests did result in a fair degree of political reforms. Tunisia, often hailed as the success story of the Arab spring, embarked on a path toward democratization that included the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of free and fair elections (Mansouri, 2020). The Tunisia n national dialogue quartet, a coalition of civil society organizations, played a

pivotal role in mediating between various political factions, demonstrating the importance of inclusive dialogue in the democratization process. This collaborative approach also helped stabilize the political landscape, while fomenting a culture of compromise and negotiation, which forms an essential characteristic of any democratic society (Mansouri, 2020).

However, Egypt's transition was riddled with mishaps. Just after the initial euphoria of his ouster and the ouster of all other politicians, the power struggle grips Mubarak between all the different political entities and military forces, especially the Muslim brotherhood (Brooks & White, 2022). The problems with moving from a regime that used to be authoritarian towards one with a democratic plan were demonstrated in 2013 by the military's eventual coup, whereby President Mohamed Morsi was removed from his position. However, dissent was subsequently cracked down upon, and a more military led government was reestablished under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, which alarmed pro democratic aspirations in Egypt.

Huntington's conception of democratization waves also provides a frame of references to more broadly assess the impact of the Arab spring. It was during 2010, 2011 during which there were several countries with a similar kind of sentiment as if they are all collectively moving on at the same time when they all woke up and had a series of uprisings in the Middle East, in North Africa. In many countries, rage against the reigning rulers was fought by citizens who demanded political change. This is something that Huntington observed democratization waves went in waves, often this is so in groups within the scope of the experience and the transnational influence. Nevertheless, contrary to these inconsistencies, the results of the Arab spring-Tunisia (a story that seems somewhat successful) and the reversal of Egypt to authoritarianism require a clear understanding of these structural, institutional and contextual factors because of democratic transitions. Based on Huntington's structure which borrows domestic circumstances and regional forces to provide explanations to democratization waves, its usefulness is a result of it.

6. Decisive Factors in the Success of Democracy in Tunisia?

Then, a lot of the differences lay in the economics in both countries or rather states and how quite different paths the two countries took to democratization. Tunisia, though its unemployment rate was high and its economy faced much pressure, could manage to maintain an economy relatively stable compared to Egypt, whose economic mismanagement, coupled with runaway inflation, only worsened the social unrest (Rapanos, 2017). The economic resilience difference would have affected the public's perception of the new political regimes' ability to implement reforms. In Tunisia, the government's emphasis on dealing with economic complaints, like youth unemployment and regional imbalances, served to prolong public commitment towards the democratic institution (Mansouri, 2020). In Egypt, however, the inability to abate economic concerns ended in massive disillusionment and a hunger for stability at the expense of democratic sentiments (Hyde, 2020).

The influence of foreign players cannot also be ruled out when comparing democratization in these two countries. International organizations, foreign governments, and regional powers have at different times been influential in shaping the political developments of Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic transition in Tunisia was supported by western nations, whereas the strategic importance of Egypt to the United States and military ties complicated the international response to Egypt's political turmoil (Hyde, 2020). These dynamics underline the importance of understanding how geopolitical interests can shape domestic political outcomes, often at the expense of genuine democratic development (Rapanos, 2017).

6.1 Relative Democratic Success of Tunisia: A Deep Dive

Tunisia's democratic transition, though riddled with problems, remains one of the few relative successes in the post-Arab spring landscape. Such success is the result of a combination of factors

that, though not necessarily predictive of long-term success, have laid the groundwork for democratic development.

Tunisia has a strong civil society with a long history of independent organizations. The Tunisia and general labour union, for example, is an old organization with a long history of activism and an important actor in mobilizing the protests that was believed to be crucial for the 2011 revolution. Other than labour unions, several organizations have played an important role in the democratization process, including human rights groups, professional associations, and women's rights organizations. These actors did not only organize and mobilize people's participation within the revolution process but continued pushing for democratic reform, checking governmental actions, and holding leaders responsible. Thus exemplified its essentialness by serving as a link to the dialogue process between the government and the opposition, part of the forming quartet that founded the national dialogue, and pleading for social justice and economic reform. Such vibrant civil society proved to be crucial in checking and balancing state power, thus generating a degree of pluralism as well as inclusive politics. According to (Zartman, 2014),

The most distinctive aspect of such a transition in Tunisia was the willingness of Tunisians to talk and compromise; the national dialogue quartet a civil society coalition engaged in negotiating the dialogue between government and opposition—is an example of people who would sacrifice all to reach a compromise. The description involved the notion of shared ownership of the democratic transition process through this very inclusive approach, often fraught with challenges in most instances. About the key feature that allowed the political process to be dissociated from a single subject or faction on the one side, and the integration of various other sides on the other side. The fact that the quartet has been inclusive, made things work out, and was willing to have difficult conversations that was the basis for this success. Such a culture of dialogue and compromise has been quite fragile, but the only way we have been able to walk the difficult path that is Tunisian politics. (National dialogue quartet, 2015).

6.2 Economic reform and socio-economic development:

Democratic gains must be consolidated in suppressing issues of socio-economic grievances that sustained 2011 revolution. However, the Tunisian government has done enough reforms for change in the economy, diversification of the economy, reduction of unemployment and enhancement of public services. But such things lack big barriers to their success including long-term unemployment, regional inequality or international economic crises. Economic reform and socio-economic development: tackling the socio-economic causes that fuelled the revolution of 2011 is necessary for Tunisia's democracy to gain sustainable ground as well as achieve stable growth. The Tunisian government recognized the value of economic reforms and undertook several initiatives on its path toward an economic system to diversify the economy, reduce the level of unemployment, and also to enhance the provision of public services. There is, for example, investment in tourism and renewable energy to support sectors identified as vital toward new employment generation and foreign investments. (Gherib, 2012)

Infrastructure: Tunisian economy main pillar, tourism, did not succumb casually to the pandemic but it also pinpointed that the need for decent reform in the health sector is to go beyond the surface. Grassroots movements and human rights advocacy movements contributed to the pillars of this transition. Grassroots movements amplified the voices of the people and availed a platform where citizens ensured that the government adhered to its reform commitments. Civil society organizations emphasized inclusivity and dialogue, fostering the culture of compromise necessary for a sustainable environment in a country's political sphere. They have provided a platform for the participation of diverse stakeholders and laid down a resilient democratic framework, thereby showing that civil engagement is no for sustainable governance. (Mansour et al., 2024)

The new constitution adopted in 2014 marked the most important milestone in the democratization process in Tunisia. The document guaranteed civil liberties, gender equality, and separation of powers, as embodied in the dreams of Tunisians for a modern and democratic state. The constitution was drafted through heavy negotiations between the political parties. It symbolized a commitment to democratic principles. Tunisia introduced electoral system and judicial reforms to consolidate democratic governance. The independent high authority for elections was put in place to oversee free and fair elections and increase public confidence in the democratic process.

7. Failure of Democracy in Egypt: Critical Analysis of Contributing Factors

The reasons of failure of democracy in Egypt after the 2011 revolution is a very complex issue deeply rooted in a combination of historical, political, socioeconomic, and institutional factors. Though the Egyptian revolution of 2011 first ignited hope for democratic change, several critical challenges thwarted the establishment of a stable democratic system. The factors that have contributed to this failure are as follows:

One of the key reasons why democracy in Egypt has failed is that the military remains entrenched as the powerful entity. Traditionally, the military has been central to the political and economic system in Egypt; they are protectors of the state, and the government also shares this role with them. The military, through the supreme council of the armed forces, took control after the ousting of Mubarak and promised a transition to civilian rule. The military remained in a position of considerable influence in Egyptian politics, at times sabotaging democratic efforts. Their reluctance to relinquish political power, even after promising democratic reform, was reflected in their handling of the transition process where they sidelined voices of civilians and prolonged political instability. It dominated not only politics but also the economy, with control over the resources across vast sectors, including construction and telecommunications, which it profited from to barter for its interests (Brooks & white ,2022). That was the case even after the election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012, since the military remained an institution to reckon with, demonstrated by its capability to dictate terms to the newly elected government. The final military coup of 2013, led by then-general Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was the death knell of Egypt's experiment with democracy since the military reasserted its authority over the state, thus eliminating the last chance for a democratic future.

Following Mubarak's ousting, political institutions in Egypt were not developed enough to aid in a successful democratic transition. The political environment was fragmented, characterized by a lack of unified opposition, weak political parties, and limited political experience among key leaders. The Muslim brotherhood, which won the 2012 elections, struggled to consolidate power effectively. While their electoral victory signalled political mobilization, it also proved to be a double-edged sword. Their failure to forge alliances with secular and liberal groups alienated significant segments of Egyptian society and exacerbated polarization. An arena without democratic tradition among both the Islamist parties and the secular camp meant a battle of frequent coups, and bad management did not make such reforms feasible as was the experience. Lack of institutional checks that complement the situation of an inferior judiciary, less than minimal democratic traditions, which had further gone to ruin from a failure or non-feasibility of sustaining a democratic transitional setup.

Political polarization in Egypt represented an insurmountable barrier to the democratization process. Immediately after the collapse of Mubarak, the political, religious, and ideological spheres of society divided the nation even further. The rise of the Muslim brotherhood was a direct dichotomy between the Islamist and secular sectors, each waging an all-out war to dominate the destiny of the state. The liberal and secular forces, including Egypt's Coptic Christian minority, fought a massive resistance against the Islamist agenda of the brotherhood for fear of marginalization in a political system where political Islam is core constitutive. The continual political and social conflict arose due to the failure to form a consensus of these issues. Most clearly during Mohamed Morsi's term, whose policies, including wanting to concentrate power in the presidency and therefore the controversial constitutional declaration that you were subjected to in November 2012 started up mass protests and

civil unrest. Mutual distrust and hostility replaced the efforts to build a stable, inclusive government, in which Islamists and secular groups became virtually at war.

In the failure of Egypt's democratic transition, economic challenges were decisive. However, change did not come to Egypt's economy after the revolution as promised. There was still an economy in Egypt with high unemployment, inflation, wide-ranging poverty, public and extremely corrupt impatience. While it was spearheaded by political demands, it also originated from the country's economic woes, especially from the youth of Egypt who simply wished for a better future for themselves. Under the transitional governments nothing changed economically, the Muslim brotherhood could not deal properly with pressing issues. It further distanced the public from the Muslim brotherhood as Morsi failed to stabilize the economy, provide social justice and economic reforms, despite the young people that had led the revolution having been promised of it. Economic crisis only added to the political instability and the ordinary Egyptians began to turn their nose away from democratic freedoms for stability and thus a dangerous cycle was established where the economic despair resulted in political apathy.

These had the impetus of the 2013 military coup that brought down Mohamed Morsi. Mass protests were on the side of the people behind the coup and to the shock of the world another government was overthrown by a military leader general Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. It effectively ended Egypt's limited period of democracy. And for the period after that till el Sisi stood for the presidency, the president was transformed into authoritarian governance based on gross human rights abuses, political opposition suppression, and suppression of dissent.

8. Conclusion

Such an uneven process of democratization has been the Arab spring, which is to say it has shaken up or drastically changed democratization processes in the Arab world, and in the middle east. This paper discusses different contradictions of Tunisia and Egypt and the reasons for the ascent of democratic governance. Thus, Tunisian transition would be considered successful if it is based on a strong civil society and a good political pluralism in combination with a favourable international dynamic that shaped the scene towards and through the transition. But the economic and social basis of such serious instability and unrest had not done sufficient damage to the democratic system that a sort of unity in politics and foundations of the democratic institutions had been built and democratic institutions had been founded.

Instead, it is in the case of Egypt that a complicated situation of vested military power and political fragmentation make further democratization difficult. The failure of Egyptian democratic movements can be found in the existence of a decisive role of the military in politics, non-existence of a single opposition and lastly, socio economic grievances that turned out to be the source of popular discontent. These factors arrived at this combination which finally led to regression to authoritarianism and the momentum on the Arab spring was unlikely to continue towards democratic progress.

This indicates that a knowledge of the very specific history, society and politics with which a country cohabits in any process of democratization is necessary. Celebrated by the Arab spring as dreams of democracy were lit across the region, not all these things have followed on since. In many ways the confluence of domestic and foreign factors which drive democratic prospects in the region, in future research will have to go further. Therefore, the Arab springs finally serves to remind us to include inclusive political dialogue, provide incentives to develop civil institutions as well as attending to socio economic disparities to better ensure the long-term sustaining of democratic governance in the region.

References

- Abushouk, A. (2024a). Arab spring. In A. Abushouk, *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of African History*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.1157>
- Abushouk, A. (2024b). Arab spring. In A. Abushouk, *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of African History*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.1157>
- Allinson, J. (2015). Class forces, transition and the Arab uprisings: A comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. *Democratization*, 22(2), 294–314. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010812>
- Al-Rousan, M. A., Alatoom, N. A., & Al-Azzam, T. (2024). The impact of the colonial legacy on the processes of democratic transition in the Arab region during the period(2011-2016). *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, 14(2), 305. <https://doi.org/10.36941/jesr-2024-0045>
- Ardıç, N. (2019). A look back at the 2011 Arab revolts the last wave of democratization, a function of capitalism, or a challenge to neoliberalism? A multi-factor analysis. *Journal of Humanity and Society (İnsan & Toplum Dergisi)*, 9(3), 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.12658/M0306>
- Ayeb, H. (2011). Social and political geography of the Tunisia n revolution: The alfa grass revolution. *Review of African Political Economy*, 38(129). <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2011.604250>
- Azab, M. (2023). Social media and gendered mobilization to high-risk campaigns in gender-repressive contexts: The case of the 2011 Egyptian protest movement. *Sociological Focus*, 56(3), 284–302. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00380237.2023.2216475>
- Baghdadi, A. S. I. (2022). The Arab s and the democratic path: Attainable or not? *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 15(3–4), 78–93. <https://doi.org/10.1525/caa.2022.15.3-4.78>
- Bank, A., & Busse, J. (2021). MENA political science research a decade after the Arab uprisings: Facing the facts on tremulous grounds. *Mediterranean Politics*, 26(5), 539–562. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2021.1889285>
- Bellin, E. (2018a). The puzzle of democratic divergence in the Arab world: Theory confronts experience in Egypt and Tunisia . *Political Science Quarterly*, 133(3), 435–474. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12803>
- Bellin, E. (2018b). The puzzle of democratic divergence in the Arab world: Theory confronts experience in Egypt and Tunisia . *Political Science Quarterly*, 133(3), 435–474. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12803>
- Bettarelli, L. (2017a). From revolution to elections. A comparative analysis of Tunisia and Egypt. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 23(2). <https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0050>
- Bettarelli, L. (2017b). From revolution to elections. A comparative analysis of Tunisia and Egypt. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 23(2). <https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0050>
- Demczuk, A. (2022). Democracy and the Arab spring. The effects of the revolutions in the Arab world. *Wschodnioznawstwo*, 16, 29–42. <https://doi.org/10.4467/20827695WSC.22.003.16752>
- Dennison, J., & Draege, J. (2021). The dynamics of electoral politics after the Arab spring: Evidence from Tunisia . *The Journal of North African Studies*, 26(4), 756–780. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2020.1732216>
- Department of Political Science, University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India, & Kuruvilla, S. J. . (2022). Can the Arab world be democratic: An analytic study from the perspective of the Arab spring. *Journal of Contemporary Politics*, 1(2), 42–48. <https://doi.org/10.53989/jcp.v1i2.9>
- Gaffar, A. (2017). Democratization and the Arab spring: A theoretical perspective. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 28(3), 112–130. <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-4216443>
- Ghannouchi, S. (2023). Emergency provisions and exceptional measures in Tunisia : Establishment of a new constitutional order. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 28(3), 477–487. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2023.2183604>
- Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (2016a). Democratization during the third wave. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 125–144. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042114-015137>
- Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (2016b). Democratization during the third wave. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 125–144. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042114-015137>

- Haynes, J. (2009). Conclusion: Religion, democratization and secularization. *Democratization*, 16(6), 1282–1291. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340903271878>
- Hobson, C. (2011). Towards a critical theory of democratic peace. *Review of International Studies*, 37(4), 1903–1922. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001634>
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* (Nachdr.). Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
- Hyde, S. D. (2020). Democracy's backsliding in the international environment. *Science*, 369(6508), 1192–1196. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb2434>
- Ihsan, M. A. (2024). Beyond the Arab spring: Flakes of pre-nation-states historical heritage of the Arab s. *Darul Ulum: Jurnal Ilmiah Keagamaan, Pendidikan Dan Kemasyarakatan*, 15(1), 73–92. <https://doi.org/10.62815/darululum.v15i1.161>
- Improving skills and employment opportunities in Tunisia* (OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1727). (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1787/51e7a341-en>
- Inmaculada Szmolka. (2015). Exclusionary and non-consensual transitions versus inclusive and consensual democratizations: The cases of Egypt and Tunisia . *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 37(1). <https://doi.org/10.13169/Arab studquar.37.1.0073>
- Ismailı, F., & Bayar, E. (2024a). Riding Samuel Huntington s waves of democracy: Unveiling the middle east s path and Egypt s democratic quest. *Akademik Tarih ve Dusunce Dergisi*, 11. <https://doi.org/10.46868/atdd.2024.764>
- Ismailı, F., & Bayar, E. (2024b). Riding Samuel Huntington s waves of democracy: Unveiling the middle east s path and Egypt s democratic quest. *Akademik Tarih ve Dusunce Dergisi*, 11. <https://doi.org/10.46868/atdd.2024.764>
- Jebnoun, N. (2014). In the shadow of power: Civil–military relations and the Tunisia n popular uprising. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 19(3), 296–316. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.891821>
- King, S. J. (2020). *The Arab winter: Democratic consolidation, civil war, and radical Islamists*. Cambridge university press.
- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2005). International linkage and democratization. *Journal of Democracy*, 16(3), 20–34. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2005.0048>
- Mansouri, F. (2022). Youth and political engagement in post-revolution Tunisia . *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 49(1), 104–120. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2020.1765142>
- Mansouri, F., Buys, R., & Elias, A. (2024). In the pursuit of social justice during political transitions: The practices of CSOs in post-Arab spring Tunisia . *Cogent Social Sciences*, 10(1), 2340834. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2340834>
- Mohammed, A. A., & Rumman, A. (2010). An assessment of democratic transition in the Arab world the case of algeria. *Ankyra Ankara*, 162–197. https://doi.org/10.1501/sbeder_0000000029
- Muhrim Djakat, Misbahuddin, M., & Kurniati, K. (2023). Changing the paradigm of states in the rabic middle east region brings authoritarianism towards democracy. *International Journal of Social Science*, 2(5), 2115–2122. <https://doi.org/10.53625/ijss.v2i5.4819>
- Munck, G. L., Huntington, S., Przeworski, A., Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G., & Valenzuela, J. S. (1994). Democratic transitions in comparative perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 26(3), 355. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422116>
- Rapanos, G. (2018). The role of human development in the transition to democracy after the Arab spring. *Mediterranean Politics*, 23(3), 364–386. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1309730>
- Şahin, O. (2023). What makes democracy possible? Transitions in Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab uprisings. *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 9(2), 167–206. <https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.969305>
- Whitehead, L. (2009). *Democratization: Theory and experience* (Reprinted). Oxford Univ. Press.
- Wiatr, J. J. (Ed.). (2019). *New authoritarianism: Challenges to democracy in the 21st century*. Barbara Budrich Publishers.