

Muslim Separatism, Partition, and the Dynamics of Hindu-Muslim Unity and Disunity in 1920s-1940s India: A Historical Analysis

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Abstract

This study examines Hindu-Muslim relations in 1920s-1940s India, focusing on factors that influenced unity and disunity between the communities. It explores the impact of the Khilafat Movement, the rejection of the Nehru Report, and the British "divide and rule" policy on Hindu-Muslim relations and India's eventual partition. The Khilafat Movement, driven by concern for the Islamic caliphate during World War I, brought Hindus and Muslims together. Unity was seen in joint gatherings and Muslim abstention from cow slaughter. The Khilafat Committee raised concerns to the British, emphasizing shared interests and religious sensitivities. However, the Muslim community rejected the Nehru Report for not addressing their demands for separate electorates and adequate Muslim representation. This strained relations and hindered finding a solution. The Congress's inflexibility on these demands further worsened the situation. The British policy of "divide and rule" exacerbated communal tensions. While aiming for a united India, their policy deepened Hindu-Muslim mistrust. The impact of the Simon Commission report and political negotiations on bridging or widening the communal divide is explored. This study provides a comprehensive understanding of the complex factors influencing Hindu-Muslim unity and disunity. It sheds light on the significance of the Khilafat Movement, the rejection of the Nehru Report, and the British divide and rule policy in shaping India's path towards partition.

Key Words

Muslim separatism, Partition, British policy, Hindu-Muslim unity, Khilafat Movement, Nehru Report, Hindu-Muslim relations, Congress Ministries, Cabinet Mission Plan.

Introduction

The demand for independence marked a significant turning point in history, yet its origins can be attributed to the preceding developments within the Muslim community. The belief that coexistence between Muslims and Hindus was untenable, leading Indian Muslims to advocate for a separate identity, can be traced back to the era of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan and potentially even earlier, with the influence of figures such as Shah Waliullah.

According to the perspective of writer K.K Aziz, Muslims' separatist tendencies can be traced back to 1892 when they were allocated a significant portion of the seats in the Central Council elections in proportion to their numerical strength. Azad, among others, argues that the partition of Bengal marked a crucial turning point in the relationship between the two communities, leading to a lasting division. According to Azad, this partition was a clear manifestation of the British

policy of "divide and rule," where the colonial power deliberately created divisions among different religious and ethnic groups to maintain control over the Indian subcontinent. Sayeed highlights that the partition of Bengal was an initial measure implemented by the British government in support of the Muslim community. The division was met with opposition from Hindus, particularly those belonging to the higher castes.

According to Khalid bin Sayeed's analysis in his book published in 1968, Muslims' separatist sentiments can be traced back to 1909 when they were granted the right to a separate electorate through the Minto-Marley Reforms. This development marked a significant turning point in the Muslim community's political aspirations and set the stage for their demands for separate representation and the protection of their interests within the political framework of colonial India. He further explains that the basis for Muslim separatism stemmed from the inherent conflicts between two divergent religions, cultures, and ideologies. The differences between Hinduism and Islam, along with their respective cultural and ideological frameworks, played a pivotal role in shaping the separatist sentiments among Muslims. Robert James Moore, the British policy of "divide and rule" played a significant role in the partition of India. He argues that the British government, through the Government of India Act of 1935, provided a constitutional guarantee of separate electorates. This guarantee, according to Moore, created a major obstacle to the development of unity based on a common nationality. In "The Great Divide" (1971), Hugh David Hodson presents a different perspective from Moore's view regarding the partition of India, which attributes the division solely to the British policy of "divide and rule." Hodson argues that the British aimed to rule India peacefully and sought to avoid creating distrust between Muslims and Hindus. He emphasizes the lack of commonalities in terms of religion, culture, customs, and way of life between the two communities. Despite coexisting for centuries, mutual trust, a crucial element for unity, was never established. In "Shameful Flight" (2006), Wolpert presents a contrasting view to Hodson's perspective by emphasizing the significant role played by the British in the partition of India. Wolpert supports the notion of the British "divide and rule" policy and argues its validity.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a prominent advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity and the visionary behind the Lucknow Pact, recognized the indispensable role of Hindu-Muslim collaboration in facilitating genuine progress in India. The principles of representation outlined in the Lucknow Pact resulted in a significant shift, transforming the Muslim majority in Bengal and Punjab into minority status. According to Wolpert's analysis, during the period of World War I, the Muslim League and the Congress, the two major political parties at the time, joined forces and collectively advocated for the attainment of dominion status. In 1921, a significant endeavour was undertaken when Gandhi joined the Khilafat Movement, emphasizing the central importance of the Khilafat for both himself and Maulana Muhammad Ali. Gandhi proclaimed that by dedicating his life to the cause of the Khilafat, he sought to ensure the protection of the cow, which holds deep religious significance for him, from potential harm caused by Muslim practices. In the chronicles of history, the concluding and ultimate endeavour was undertaken by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Following his electoral defeat in 1937, Jinnah extended an offer to Jawaharlal Nehru for a coalition government in the United Province (UP). However, this proposal was declined by Nehru. Conversely, the Hindu community did not make any notable efforts to address the

concerns raised by their Muslim counterparts. Aziz expounds upon the numerous instances where leaders and scholars delivered speeches that were antagonistic towards Muslims. Furthermore, a Hindu writer went so far as to suggest that Muslims should renounce their religion if they wished to reside in India.

Ayesha Jalal described in her book "The Sole Spokesman," the responsibility for the partition of India lies with the Congress and its leaders, rather than M.A. Jinnah who was not initially inclined towards the idea. Jalal argues that Jinnah's primary objective was to secure parity in the central government, specifically advocating for a one-third representation, which he deemed necessary to safeguard the rights and interests of the Muslim community within a united India. Abul Kalam Azad concurred with Jalal's argument, acknowledging that initially, the non-cooperative stance of the Congress and later, the non-cooperative attitude of the Muslim League, laid the foundation for the creation of Pakistan.

Uma Kaura, in her work "Muslims and Indian Nationalism" published in 1977, highlights that the divergence between Muslims and the Congress party began with the rejection of all demands put forth by Muslim leaders in the Nehru Report. These demands were deemed essential for the protection of Muslim interests. Kaura argues that the Muslim leadership was prepared to relinquish their demand for separate electorates if the Congress party had accepted other demands, such as the separation of Sindh from Bombay, Muslim representation in the central legislature, and constitutional reforms in NWFP and Baluchistan. She asserts that none of the Muslim League's demands posed a threat to the unity of India. Moreover, Kaura contends that the Congress party's failure to satisfy the Muslims, including the rejection of the coalition government offer by the Muslim League in 1937, can be attributed to the pro-Hindu policies of the Congress, which ultimately contributed to the separation of Muslims and the birth of Pakistan.

The aforementioned discussions fail to provide a definitive understanding regarding Muslim separatism and the formation of Pakistan. Various writers present their own explanations and interpretations on the subject. Pakistani Nationalist historians attribute the establishment of Pakistan to historical events, the behaviour of the Indian National Congress, and the two-nation theory. Conversely, British writers reject the notion that British policies were responsible for the partition, as both parties were provided numerous opportunities such as the Simon Commission report, Round Table Conferences, August Offer, Cripps Mission, and Cabinet Mission Plan. The British aimed to unify all political forces under a united India, as no single party represented the entire Indian population. However, the deep-seated mistrust between the two communities served as the foundation for the partition of India. Despite cohabitating for nearly a millennium, both communities possessed distinct differences.

Hindu Nationalists attribute blame for the partition to the British authorities, particularly Lord Linlithgow, due to his implementation of a "divide and rule" policy, as well as to M.A. Jinnah. They contend that there was no issue of Muslim nationalism in India and that Jinnah instigated the matter in opposition to Indian nationalism. They also criticize the British Government for the separation, while Indian Nationalists fail to address the historical events and behaviours of Congress leaders. Ayesha Jalal presents an alternative narrative, suggesting that Jinnah was not inclined to establish Pakistan; instead, he solely sought greater representation for Muslims within colonial India.

Research Questions

1. How did the Khilafat Movement contribute to Hindu-Muslim unity in the

1920s-1930s in India?

2. What were the reasons behind the rejection of the Nehru Report by the Muslim community and its impact on Hindu-Muslim relations?

3. To what extent did the British policy of "divide and rule" influence the Hindu-Muslim disunity and the partition of India?

Hindu-Muslim Unity and Disunity in the 1920s-1940s India

The Khilafat is a significant institution in Islam, entrusted to the followers and companions (Sahaba-Karam) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. It represents the governance and administration of the Islamic state, with the appointed leader known as the Caliph. When Hazrat Umer (R.A.) assumed the Khilafat, he took on the title of Khalifa, signifying his role as the successor to the Prophet Muhammad and the representative of Allah. During World War I, the Khilafat became a significant concern for Indian Muslims as it was held by the House of Osman in Turkey, with Sultan Abdul Majid serving as the Khalifa of Islam. The institution held a position of central authority and power for Muslims in India, who strongly opposed any form of humiliation or disrespect towards the caliphate by external powers.

Amidst the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Turkey aligned itself with Germany as a partner. However, Turkey faced defeat at the hands of the Allies. This military defeat and the subsequent occupation of Turkish territories by the Allies posed a significant threat to the Khilafat. The Allies, at the conclusion of World War I, covertly devised plans to divide up Turkey, which further endangered the institution of the Khilafat. Muslims in India had deep sympathy for the Caliphate and their Turkish brethren during World War I. However, the British Government in India was intolerant of any support for the Caliphate. The Muslims were outraged by the division of the Ottoman Empire, which further fuelled their anger. Under the leadership of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. M.A. Ansari, Muslims formed the Khilafat Conference and held their first meeting in Delhi on November 24, 1918. They decided that unless their demands were met, they would boycott peace celebrations. Mahatma Gandhi supported the Muslims' cause and urged them to launch a Non-cooperation Movement against the British Government. During the annual session of the All India Congress in December 1920, Jinnah again voiced his opposition to Gandhi's Non-cooperation Movement, warning of potential conflicts between Hindus and Muslims and questioning its chances of success with inexperienced and illiterate participants.

The Non-Cooperation or Satyagraha Movement was formally declared by the Indian National Congress in December 1920 to pressure the British authorities. The movement capitalized on the emotions of the people, particularly the Muslims who were critical of the British due to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the uncertain future of Islamic holy lands in Arabia. Gandhi forged strong relationships with the Muslim religious class, particularly the Deobandi School of thought, to garner support. However, Muhammad Ali Jinnah had reservations and believed that certain steps were needed for Hindu-Muslim unity and achieving Swaraj. In 1921, Hindu-Muslim unity reached its pinnacle, with Muslims refraining from cow slaughter during Eid-ul-Azha. Swami Shirdhand, a Hindu leader, was invited to deliver a speech at Jamia Masjid, showcasing the inclusive atmosphere. The Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind issued a fatwa signed by 925 Ulamas, urging participation in the non-violent and Non-cooperation Movement.

The Khilafat Committee, led by Dr. M.A. Ansari, decided to send a delegation of

Hindu-Muslim leaders to meet with the Viceroy. The delegation emphasized that any humiliation of the Caliph and sacred places would not be tolerated by Muslims and Hindus alike. They urged the government to avoid actions that would provoke the sentiments of Muslims and stressed that no partition of Jaziratul-Arab (Arabian Peninsula) should occur, as it contained significant holy sites for Islam. The Viceroy assured them of addressing concerns regarding the holy places, while also urging that religious and political matters be kept separate. The British Prime Minister pledged that Turkey would not be broken up, and all occupied areas would be returned after the war. Under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Johar, a delegation visited Britain to convey that Muslims would never surrender Jaziratul Arab to a non-Muslim government. However, their visit did not yield success, and they returned empty-handed.

In conclusion, the Khilafat Movement served as a powerful catalyst for Hindu-Muslim unity during a critical period in India's history. The movement resonated deeply with Indian Muslims, who viewed the Caliphate as a central authority and symbol of their religious identity. The support for the Khilafat cause brought Hindus and Muslims together, with leaders like Mahatma Gandhi advocating for joint action against the British Government. The movement witnessed significant moments of unity, such as Hindus participating in Muslim gatherings and Muslims refraining from cow slaughter during religious festivals. The Khilafat Committee's efforts to raise concerns and seek assurances from the British authorities further highlighted the shared concerns of Hindus and Muslims. While the movement ultimately faced challenges and did not achieve all its objectives, it remains a notable example of Hindu-Muslim solidarity and the collective pursuit of justice and religious freedom.

Jinnah called a meeting of Muslim leaders in Delhi in March 1927 to discuss proposals for Hindu-Muslim unity, including the concept of separate electorates for Muslims in provincial autonomy within a federal India. Lala Lajpat Rai, a leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, supported the idea of partition and proposed the division of Punjab into two provinces based on religious majority, with the western part for Muslims and the eastern part for Sikhs. He also suggested the creation of four separate Muslim-majority states: NWFP, Western Punjab, Eastern Bengal, and Sindh. Congress showed satisfactory behaviour towards the Delhi Muslim Proposal in 1927, with the Congress Committee at Bombay assenting to the Muslim Proposal except for the separation of Sindh from Bombay. The All India National Congress took steps to invite other political parties, including the left and right wings of the Muslim League, to join in the creation of a unanimous Constitution. However, the objectives of the subsequent All Parties Conference were not achieved due to the non-participation of some political parties, including a right-wing faction of the Muslim League. As a result, a small committee was formed to address the communal problem and its relation to the Constitution.

Simon Commission report, issued in May 1930, rejected the demand for a unitary form of government in India and instead proposed a federal system of government. The report also recommended the annulment of diarchy in provincial administration and suggested that all departments should be handed over to ministries, which would be accountable to the provincial Legislative Assembly. The Congress vehemently opposed the Simon Commission report and made the

decision to launch the Civil Disobedience Movement against the government, citing the report's lack of alignment with the Nehru report. However, the Muslim community rejected participation in this movement.

The Nehru Report failed to adequately address the communal issues in India, as it did not fulfil the demands of the Muslim community for a federal system of government, separation of Sindh from Bombay, and the assurance of a separate electorate. Muslim leaders strongly opposed the report, and at the All-India Muslim Conference, they demanded separate electorates and Muslim representation in Hindu majority provinces. Congress displayed rigidity in accepting these demands, leading to tensions and challenges in finding a suitable solution for Muslim representation in the central legislature.

Jinnah's presentation of the fourteen points in 1929, emphasizing separate electorates, one-third representation, and a federal system, played a significant role in shaping the movement for the creation of Pakistan. However, Congress rejected these points, recognizing that Muslim opinion was not unified and that Jinnah's leadership represented only one faction within the Muslim community. Despite attempts to arrange a meeting between Jinnah and Gandhi in 1929 to address the communal problems, the efforts were unsuccessful as both leaders were unable to find a solution. The demands and concerns of the Muslim community, as well as the position of the Hindu Mahasabha, posed significant challenges in reaching a consensus. The behavior of Congress leaders and the content of the Nehru Report had a detrimental effect on the attempts to foster Hindu-Muslim unity, which had been initiated during the Khilafat Movement. As a result of this unfortunate discord, prominent Muslim leaders in undivided India abandoned their efforts towards Hindu-Muslim unity.

The first session of the Round Table Conference in November 1930 saw the participation of various parties, excluding Congress, which had demanded the full implementation of the Nehru Report and clarification on the objective of the conference regarding dominion status for India. As the Viceroy did not provide the desired assurance, Congress abstained from the conference and subsequently launched the Civil Disobedience Movement in March-April 1930. Despite efforts by Jinnah to prevent escalating tensions between Congress and the government through negotiations, a meeting involving Jinnah, Gandhi, Nehru, Vithalbhai, and Sapru with the Viceroy failed to yield positive results, as the discussions did not lead to a resolution of the growing conflict. The Round Table Conference marked an important milestone in India's constitutional discussions, with the approval of a federal system being a significant decision. However, a major obstacle arose during the conference regarding the distribution of subjects within the federal system, leading to a deadlock.

The Second Round Table Conference held in 1931 failed in resolving the issues related to minority rights and the federal structure. On the final day of the conference, British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald urged all leaders to reach a unanimous agreement on minority issues, warning that the British Government would intervene if no consensus was reached. The period from 1937 to 1939 witnessed discontent among many Muslims towards Congress Ministries. This dissatisfaction stemmed from various factors, including the use of Bande Mataram

at the opening of assemblies, the display of the Congress flag at administrative buildings, the establishment of a military department by Congress for the national army, the requirement for children to salute Gandhi's portrait in government schools, the replacement of Urdu with Hindi in certain regions, and the appointment of Congress members to government positions. Additionally, accounts by individuals such as Francis Yeats-Brown and British historian Sir Reginald Coupland indicate that this period saw an increase in communal disputes, riots, robberies, and murders on a larger scale.

In conclusion, the period from 1937 to 1939 witnessed a significant increase in disputes and divisions between the Muslim League and Congress. Despite initial efforts by the Labour Government in the early 1930s to bring the two parties together, by 1939, the British authorities appeared content with the division and differences between them. The failure of unity can be attributed to various factors, including the demand of Chaudhry Rehmat Ali, the founder of the Pakistan National Movement, which some Hindu nationalists refused to accept and negotiate, as well as the policies and actions of the Congress Ministries. Furthermore, the escalation of communal disputes further exacerbated the rift between the Muslim League and Congress. These factors collectively contributed to the failure of achieving unity between the two major political parties in India during this period.

The correspondence and meetings between Gandhi and Jinnah during a critical period of India's history highlighted their differing perspectives on the issue of settlement and the future of Muslim representation. While Gandhi expressed his willingness to meet Jinnah and conveyed his friendship and support for Indian Muslims, Jinnah's response and the subsequent discussions revealed their disagreements on various key points.

The Rajagopalachari formula, which proposed Muslim League's endorsement of independence and cooperation with Congress for a national government, along with specific boundaries for the North-West and Eastern areas, failed to meet the demands of the Lahore Resolution according to Jinnah. He insisted on the creation of two zones of Pakistan based on six provinces, including Punjab, Sindh, Bengal, Assam, North-West Frontier, and Baluchistan.

Despite agreeing on the allocation of a separate area in Punjab for Muslims in clear majority who desired separation from the rest of India, Gandhi fundamentally disagreed with the notion of Muslims as a separate nation. He argued that while Muslims had the right to separate themselves, this separation should not be based on the concept of a separate nation, as they were part of a larger family consisting of multiple members.

The failure of the talks between Jinnah and Gandhi was met with a philosophical acceptance by the people of India. Many parties and the public were not surprised by this outcome, as there existed a significant divergence in opinions between Congress and the Muslim League. The deep divide between these two major political entities made the breakdown of the talks almost inevitable. Consequently, the news of the failed negotiations was met with a sense of resignation, as it reflected the longstanding differences between Congress and the Muslim League that were difficult to bridge.

Muslim Separatism, Partition, and the Dynamics...

The Shimla Conference and the Muslim League's demand for Muslim representation in the Executive Council were key points of contention between Jinnah and the Viceroy. Despite efforts to foster unity between the Muslim League and Congress, Jinnah remained firm on his stance regarding the acceptance of the demand for Pakistan, leading to a disagreement on nominations for Muslim members. The failure of the Shimla Conference was attributed to the inability of Congress and the Muslim League to agree on the strength and composition of the Executive Council. Despite the Viceroy's efforts to find a solution acceptable to all parties, the absence of a list of names from the Muslim League hindered the progress. The Viceroy took full responsibility for the failure and emphasized that no blame should be placed on any of the participating parties.

The general elections held in December 1945 resulted in the victory of two major political parties, the All India National Congress and the Muslim League. The election outcome highlighted the presence of two prominent political streams representing the Hindu and Muslim communities in India, respectively. The results underscored the growing significance of the Congress party as the representative of the Hindu population and the Muslim League as the representative of the Muslims in the Indian political landscape. The results of the provincial legislature elections showed that the Muslim League had greater support among Muslims compared to the Congress party. These results highlighted the fact that the Muslim League was the main representative party for Muslims, while the Congress party primarily represented non-Muslim communities. The elections revealed that both parties achieved significant victories, but their success was concentrated in their respective strongholds. The Congress party emerged victorious in provinces with Hindu majority populations, while the Muslim League secured its success in provinces with Muslim majority populations.

A parliamentary delegation visited India in January 1946 to establish personal contact with Indian leaders, and during their meetings, Jinnah reiterated his demands for the acceptance of the principle of Pakistan and "parity." He insisted on the creation of two constitution-making bodies, one for Pakistan and another for the rest of India. The delegation recognized the inevitability of Pakistan's creation and briefed the Cabinet Mission on the prevailing situation in India. Subsequently, a convention was held on January 28, 1946, to discuss the formation of a new Executive Council and a new constitution-making body, where Jinnah emphasized the Muslims' refusal to cooperate under a single constitution-making body and warned of potential revolt.

The main objective of the Mission was to establish an agreement among Indian leaders regarding the formulation of a self-governing constitution and the creation of an interim government to oversee the constitutional process. The Cabinet Mission engaged in extensive deliberations with various political parties, communities, Indian States, Scheduled Castes, and Sikhs, but due to the lack of consensus, it proposed two potential solutions: a weaker Pakistan and a loose federation, where the Federation would handle foreign affairs, defense, and communication, while provinces could form groups and have their own legislatures. During a meeting with the Cabinet Mission on April 4th, Jinnah asserted that the significant differences among the people of the subcontinent necessitated the division of India as the only viable solution. After consulting with

various parties, the Mission met with Jinnah again on April 16th, where Sir Pethick-Lawrence informed him that the likelihood of his demand for Pakistan being accepted was minimal. Lawrence presented Jinnah with two options: a smaller, sovereign Pakistan or a larger Pakistan without sovereignty. Jinnah responded by emphasizing the acceptance of the principle of Pakistan, suggesting that the issue of territories could be addressed later. The Cabinet Mission presented a plan on May 16th that acknowledged the demand for Pakistan and proposed a united India with a central government responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Communication. The plan also included provisions for provincial autonomy, communal issue resolution through majority voting, residual powers assigned to provinces, and the formation of three groups for constitutional development. Additionally, an interim government based on parity between Hindus and Muslims was suggested. Gandhi responded positively to the Mission's statement, acknowledging that it fulfilled the obligation of the British to free India from their rule. He believed that the statement held the potential to transform India into a land without sorrow and suffering. However, the Mission's statement did not align with the demands of Jinnah and the Muslim League. Their requests for parity, financial powers, a separate legislature, independent states, and executive authority were rejected by the statement. Nehru and other Congress leaders viewed the Cabinet Mission Plan as a victory for the Congress, as it effectively buried Jinnah's idea of Pakistan with the approval of the British Government. However, Jinnah expressed his dissatisfaction, stating that the Mission disregarded the concerns and demands of Muslims and accused it of favoring Congress. The British perception of the Mission was generally positive, but the Daily Telegraph criticized it for not adequately considering the demands of the Muslims and the Muslim League. The Sikhs and Scheduled Castes also rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan, deciding to oppose it. In a meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee, the party protested the plan, considering it unjustified and unconvincing. Although the League maintained that Pakistan was its goal, it accepted the plan due to the ongoing turmoil in India and the hope that the Muslim-majority provinces in Groups B and C would eventually lead to the establishment of Pakistan. Jinnah was also authorized by the Muslim League to negotiate regarding the interim government.

Conclusion

This research article delved into the intricate dynamics of Muslim separatism, the partition of India, and the complex interplay between Hindu-Muslim unity and disunity during the crucial period of the 1920s to 1940s. Through a meticulous historical analysis, it has shed light on the multifaceted factors that shaped the trajectory of communal relations in pre-independence India. The study revealed that the seeds of Muslim separatism were sown in the early 20th century, driven by various factors such as political aspirations, perceived economic disparities, and the desire to safeguard religious identity. The rise of prominent Muslim leaders and organizations advocating for separate Muslim representation and political rights further fueled the demand for a separate homeland. Amidst this backdrop, the dynamics of Hindu-Muslim unity and disunity played a pivotal role. The research elucidated the instances of interfaith collaboration and shared nationalist aspirations that showcased the potential for harmonious coexistence. However, it also uncovered the deep-rooted fissures, exacerbated by religious, political, and socio-economic factors, which hindered sustained unity between the two

communities. The culmination of these complex dynamics was the partition of India in 1947, leading to the birth of Pakistan as a separate nation. The analysis highlighted how the demands for Muslim separateness, coupled with communal tensions and political maneuvering, ultimately influenced the course of history and shaped the destiny of the subcontinent. By examining the historical context and analyzing various perspectives, this research article has contributed to a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics surrounding Muslim separatism, partition, and the dynamics of Hindu-Muslim unity and disunity in 1920s-1940s India. It underscores the significance of historical analysis in comprehending the complex fabric of religious and communal relations, providing valuable insights for scholars, policymakers, and those interested in understanding the historical complexities of the Indian subcontinent.

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