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Islamic Reform: A Historiography

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Abstract:
This paper surveys four decades of English-language scholarship on eighteenth- to twentieth-century Sunni Islamic reform movements, with particular attention to Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Indian subcontinent. It argues that historians have increasingly converged on a broad consensus: the Islamic world's encounter with Western modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries represents a significant rupture, rather than simple continuity, with the largely indigenous reform projects of the eighteenth century. Beginning from John Voll's early synthetic account and Barbara Metcalf's work on Deoband, the essay traces how later studies by Ahmad Dallal, Natana DeLong-Bas, David Dean Commins, Itzchak Weismann, Henri Lauzière, and Brannon Ingram challenge crisis-and-decline narratives by foregrounding Ijtihad, regional specificity, and close textual engagement with primary sources. The historiography thus reveals both a postcolonial re-centering of Muslim intellectuals as interpretive authorities and an emerging interest in how reform circulates through networks, publics, and affective communities "from below," pointing toward future work on popular reception and bottom-up dynamics of Islamic reform.

Keywords: Islamic Reform, Western Modernity, Salafism, Postcolonial Scholarship, Historiography

In the final third of the twentieth century, the Islamic revolution in Iran, and Islamic revivalist movements in Southeast Asia and West Africa coincided with the Afghan war which proved to be the final frontier in the Cold War, putting Islam at the center of international politics. Many Muslim majority states, in the same period, started "re-examining their legal structures in the light of Quran and the requirements of traditional Islamic law."[1] John Voll suggested that the rise of Western modernity had been characterized by secularization of state operations and marginalization of religion, suggesting by contrast that Islamic world's encounter with the western modernity had

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produced a different response. He, therefore, called for greater understanding of Islam's encounter with modernity and identified a large gap in the scholarship about Islamic reform in the eighteenth century so much so that this period seemed like "the dark age of Islam."[2] This was almost four decades ago. The world has, since then, witnessed, alongside disintegration of the USSR and the Gulf wars, an "Islamic threat facing Western civilization"[3] embodied in Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the ISIS. Popular imagination became familiar with this threat through media's employment of terms like fundamentalist Islam, *Wahhabism*, and *Salafism*.[4] Working against this background, many Western historians have attempted to understand contemporary Islam by tracing its intellectual and material origins to Islamic reform movements of the eighteenth century. This paper explores the historiography of Islamic reform and revival movements from the eighteenth century to the present day. This historiography, as I hope to demonstrate, provides evidence of historians, by engaging with each other's work, collectively constructing a broad consensus around the idea that the Islamic world's encounter with the Western modernity in the nineteenth century signifies a rupture in the reform project of the eighteenth century. In doing so, I argue that there is a clear methodological evolution in the field as historians over the past twenty years have approached Islamic reform through greater engagement with the primary sources. The scope of this historiography will be limited to historical works published over the past four decades focusing on *Sunni* reform movements originating in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Indian Subcontinent.

I proceed with this historiography from the premise that contemporary historians have extensively engaged with earlier works in the field. To substantiate this claim, I shall use two early works by John Voll and Barbara Metcalf, both published in 1982, as instances of how later historians have expanded, or argued against claims of earlier historians. John Voll's *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (1982) takes up the "emerging fundamentalism of the 1970's"[5] and approaches it by reading the history of Islam through four "basic styles of action"[6]: adaptationist which represents the early syncretism in newly conquered lands; conservative that appears around the tenth century and is characterized by a return to the *salaf*; fundamentalist, characterized by the *Wahhabis,* which originates in the eighteenth century and insists on "a permanent standard to use in judging existing conditions"[7] and often resorts to violent political activism; and humanist which privileges personal over collective and is found, though nominally, in *Shi'i* and *Sufi* traditions. In identifying the eighteenth century as 'the dark age of Islam' that needed illumination, Voll pointed out a rich avenue for further research. He argued that "the new movements of the eighteenth century had an awareness of the larger *ummah* while operating within the context of specific local conditions,"[8] an orientation that has been endorsed and furthered by most of the subsequent historians. Although Voll's use of 'fundamentalism' was problematic, he made another crucial contribution by employing radical and

traditional as analytical categories, and these informed the work of Henri Lauzière who reconceptualized them more than three decades later as 'purist' and 'modernist' to discuss *Salafism* in the twentieth century. Another way in which Voll's work has been seminal for the later historians is its critique of the "crisis perspective" found in the writings of Geoffrey Godsell and G. H. Jansen who implied that Islamic world in the eighteenth-century was in a crisis of adjustment vis-à-vis European modernity and has responded to it through defiant militancy and regression into conservative static Islamic values.[9] Both Itzchak Weismann and Ahmad Dallal expand Voll's critique of the theory of decline to show how Islam's interaction with the Western modernity was a later, and vastly more complicated affair. Voll's characterization of *Wahhabism* as radical fundamentalism which, in his view defined the eighteenth-century reformist trend, proved seminal for DeLong-Bas's work[10] on *Wahhabi* Islam more than two decades later. I, therefore, consider John Voll's book as an early and provisional history that inspired a wide range of subsequent works on the subject.

What truly distinguishes John Voll's work from later historians is reflected in the kind of resources he was employing. Voll does not provide a bibliography at the end of his book and only hints at suggested readings in the form of commentaries. These suggested readings are peculiar because they include only European texts. Voll's own book, a survey of Islam over fourteen centuries spread across half the globe, is astonishingly thin on references, a meagre eleven pages, and it almost never engages with primary sources. As I explained earlier, Voll's work has been cited extensively by all the historians who form this historiography, but the major difference appears in the kind of primary sources these historians have chosen. DeLong-Bas, to offer a contrast, cites twenty-three book length works of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This change in approach, from a general political history informed by political and economic conditions to a close textual analysis of the writings that have shaped Islamic reform and revival from the middle of the eighteenth-century to the present, is a key indicator of the shift in historical perspective and has yielded considerably different inferences in twenty-first century works of history. This shift reflects a more immersive approach adopted by later historians, and this shifting of the center to erstwhile periphery reflects a postcolonial shift in historiography which, though never without political framing, is more focused on knowing these intellectual forces from primary sources rather than from secondary interpretations.

Ahmad S. Dallal in his *Islam without Europe: Traditions of Reform in the Eighteenth-Century Islamic Thought* argues that the Islamic reform, in the eighteenth century, was indigenous and was not in response to the Western modernity. Dallal's argument differs with established orientalist theories of decline because of his choice of cultural and intellectual history as the preferred framework, rather than political history.[11] He concedes that any history focusing on the military, political, and economic fortunes of the three great Muslim empires of the period; the Safavid, the Ottoman, and the

Moghul, was likely to frame its discourse in the decline theory.[12] In addition to his critique of the orientalist historians, he argues against the popular methodological assumption that the intellectual and reformist output of the Muslim thought in the eighteenth century was in response to "European challenge", thereby arguing against a Eurocentric methodological approach which implicitly worked through center/periphery binary.[13] For Dallal, Europe is the key difference between the eighteenth century and later Islamic thought. He writes,

> The most noticeable absence from the thought of all the major Muslim intellectuals of the eighteenth century is Europe. Even when some of these thinkers were aware of colonial encroachments on Muslim lands, they did not appreciate the extent of the threat these infringements presented, nor did such events influence their thought: Europe, as a politico-cultural challenge, was completely absent. Of course, the exact opposite is true of later Islamic thought, where the challenge of Europe drives all the famous thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[14]

Dallal's key analytical category is *ijtihad*, which he argues, was the defining feature of the eighteenth century Islamic thought, and he argues his case on the evidence found in the lives and writings of Muḥammad Ibn Ismaʿil al-Amir al-Ṣanʿani of Yemen, Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi of India, Muḥammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab of Arabia, Uthman Ibn Fudi of West Africa, Muḥammad Ibn Ali al-Shawkani of Yemen, and Muḥammad Bin ʿAli al-Sanusi of North Africa[15]. In foregrounding *ijtihad*, he proposes an indigenous modernity in Islamic thought which was anthropocentric in connecting man to God and liberating him in social action, though characteristically different from European enlightenment and humanism. Dallal's argument is substantiated through DeLong-Bas's work on Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who appears to be a *mujtahid* of Najd when read from his own works. She in particular refers to his *Kitab al-Nikah* where he differs from established Hanbali legal opinions to exercise *maslahah* in determining the rights of women in matters related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. He also forbade sexual relations with slave women which was radically modern for his society and not in keeping with cultural practices of the eighteenth century Arab.

Dallal also discusses the relationship between Islamic reform and global terror of the contemporary era. He puts John Voll and Fazlur Rahman's 'continuity thesis' of intellectual thought and its connections with the present to critique on the grounds that the eighteenth-century experience was essentially indigenous and does not provide a satisfactory framework for tracing the genealogies of modern nationalist allegories to the eighteenth century reform movements. This finds support in Ingram, Weismann and Commins who see the rise of Indian Muslim nationalism and Arabism as responses to forces of colonialism and the rise of nation state consciousness. Earlier reform movements were essentially regional, and despite sharing the

common ideal of *ijtihad* and a common network of teachers based in *Haramayn*, these movements were often remarkably divergent in their approach. Moreover, as Dallal's conclusion shows, the colonial experience and the contemporary world may offer more clues to the rise of fundamentalism than do the writings of the eighteenth century reformers.

To understand the patterns of continuity and change, Itzchak Weismann's *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* is a precursor to Dallal's argument and presents its case through three chronologically ordered case studies. Weismann seeks "to trace the emergence of modern Islam from its roots in the latter-day reformist tradition".[16] Weismann's discussion of tradition in the nineteenth century Syria is informed by its encounter with "Western project of modernity".[17] Drawing on Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Alain Touraine, Anthony Giddens and Benedict Anderson's concept of Western modernity, he argues that Islamic states, on their first encounter with the Western modernity, differed from the West in three major respects: the intelligentsia in Islamic world still consisted mainly of *ulama* and not of rationalist secular philosophers; state capitalism was still in nascent stages and the bourgeoisie was relatively independent in trade matters; and the official bureaucracy was more local than central. He evokes John Voll and aims at tracing "processes of continuity and change from *Khalidiyya* to *Akbariyya* to the *Salafiya*"[18] by expanding Albert Hourani's model of the politics of the notables to the wider social history of religion. Weismann's analysis shows that Shaykh Khalid's *Naqshbandi* training and reform efforts were meant to "influence the rulers and, through them the entire *umma*, to return to the path of the *shari'a* and thus restore its vitality"[19]. His identification of the rupture, however, is presented through Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi who experienced European modernity during his time in France and later spearheaded *Akbariyya* reform from 1855 to 1883, which criticized the traditional learning and advocated the adoption of Western rationalist approach. However, the steady decline of the Ottoman empire and the European incursions led to popular discontent among the younger Syrians who sought inspiration in Ibn Taymiyya's radical thought towards the middle of the twentieth century. This disgruntled youth, as also theorized by Lauzière, was divided into the more orthodox who advocated a return to the religion, a purist *Salafism*, and modernists who tried to reform states to avoid servility to the Western invasion and founded nationalistic *Arabism*. The traditional *ulama* were increasingly seen by the younger generations as incapable of dealing with the challenges of Western modernity and 'politics of notables' increasingly became popular *Salafism* inspired by Muhammad Abdu' and Sayyid Qutb. Weismann argues that the rise of *Arabism* was also a way of asserting the ethnic Arab identity of the *Salaf,* so in essence, the divide between the orthodox and modern *Salafis* was cosmetic. Weismann's analysis reveals that Islamic society's encounter with Western modernity changed the way Islamic reform was envisioned and executed by later generations.

Historians of Islamic reform have increasingly tended towards textual analyses or social histories, though Henri Lauzière presents a different approach as he employs a philological approach to see how Orientalist learning shaped Islamic reform in late nineteenth century. *Salafism*, as Henri Lauzière suggests, is hard to date because the term has been in use since at least the medieval period by the Muslim scholars.[20] Lauzière suggests that the use of the term as a proper noun has no historical precedence and its current usage entails different meanings in different contexts. Lauzière's position that pre-twentieth century usage of the term referred mainly to those who believed in Hanbali (and neo-Hanbli) theology but were not the followers of a particular legal tradition leads him to argue that *Salafism* was initially a misnomer employed by nineteenth century French orientalists that was later picked up by Muslim scholars in Morocco and Arabian Peninsula. Rising from such a fallacy, *Salafism* in its current form was shaped by the writings of Muhammad Abdu', al-Afghani, and Sayyid Qutb, intellectuals who did not consider themselves *Salafis*. He also argues that *Salafism* is very different from *Wahhabism* and can be applied to anyone who "abided by the doctrine of the forefathers, irrespective of their views on modernity".[21]

In this, he echoes Weismann's view that *Salafism* is a late nineteenth century and early twentieth century phenomenon and should not be confused with the eighteenth century or earlier reform movements. This essentially questions John Voll's continuity thesis as *Salafis* sought inspiration in the tenth century rather than from the *Wahhabis*. Notwithstanding the historically shaky foundations of the term, he deploys it as a contemporary identity and distinguishes between modernist *Salafism* espoused by Muhammad Abdu'h, al-Afghani and Rashid Rida, and purist *Salafism* found in the teachings of Muqbil al-Wadi'i and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. The modernist *Salafis* "sought to reconcile Islam with the social, political, and intellectual ideals of the Enlightenment".[22] These thinkers were pro-democracy pan-Islamists who considered science and progressive education as necessary to their societies and equated such an effort with the conduct of the forefathers. Modernist *Salafis* disappeared after the end of colonial period and were replaced by post-independence Purist *Salafis* who are present across the globe as Islamic nationalists and have inspired contemporary fundamentalists.[23] For the purpose of this historiography, though, Luzière's work lends support to the idea that nineteenth and twentieth century reform movements represent a rupture with the past and evolved in response to Islamic world's encounter with the Western modernity and do not represent a continuity with the reform movements of the past in as much as those movements were truly indigenous.

John Voll had termed *Wahhabis* of the eighteenth century as fundamentalists who were the ideological forefathers of contemporary terrorists.[24] Voll had, however, had not substantiated his claim by citing any primary sources. In response to him, Natana DeLong-Bas's book *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* argues that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings prove him to be a modern Najdi scholar writing strictly for

his time and place. In doing so, her methodological approach was rooted in a close textual analysis of the Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings. She had exclusive access to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings and she, therefore, had a chance to introduce the *Wahhabi* ideologue to the world.[25] She considered this effort worthwhile because of the popularity of books like *The Two Faces* of Islam which exhibited their ignorance of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as "(a) bumpkin from an obscure village in a distant district nobody had ever heard of".[26]

Contextualizing Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century Najd, DeLong-Bas argues that "Wahhabism was neither a historical aberration nor an isolated phenomenon"[27] but was a part of wider reformist movements of the eighteenth century. In doing so, DeLong-Bas offers an intellectual history devoted to close textual analysis of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's works rather than trying to understand his intellectual outlook from the actions of Saudi state and terrorists like Osama bin Laden. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab promoted *ijtihad* against *taqlid* as was common among the eighteenth century reformers in other parts of the world and argued for "theological necessity of the constant existence of *mujtahids* in history".[28] In this, DeLong-Bas not only confirms Dallal's argument but also highlights methodological problem in Voll's work who had not engaged with Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings.

In matters related to *Jihad* and violence, DeLong-Bas engages in an extensive study of *Kitab al-Jihad* and *Kitab al-Tawhid* to argue that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings provide no clue of sanctioning of violence without strict conditions. Delong-Bas dissociates Ibn Abd al-Wahhab from political deployment of his teachings on *jihad* since, even in his life, "not only did he not endorse them, but he also chastised as ignorant those who pursued this path".[29] She also argues that Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden's views on jihad do not match Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings in *Kitab al-Jihad* but are closer to Ibn Taymiyya's.[30] In this, she endorses Weismann and Lauzière's argument that the twentieth century Salafism was inspired by Egyptian nationalists who followed Ibn Taymiyya rather than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

In approaching Ibn Abd al-Wahhab through a close analysis of his writings, DeLong-Bas challenges popular claims about his teachings and complements Dallal's argument who also reserves a chapter to discuss the writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. David Dean Commins, writing two years after DeLong-Bas, extends the argument further to trace the evolution of the Wahhabi mission in Saudi political system since the late eighteenth century. Unlike DeLong-Bas's purely textual analysis, Commins frames these texts within the political history of Saudi Arabia. Although Commins' understanding of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's role does not differ from DeLong-Bas, his political history sees *Wahhabism* in two distinct phases. He argues that early deployment of *Wahhabism* was characterized by religious zeal and tribal loyalty. The alliance between al-Saud and the *Wahhabis* worked and its popularity was manifested by the peaceful takeover of Medina by the *Wahhabis* in 1803. Muhammad Ali's invasions and executions of *Wahhabi ulama* weakened the *Wahhabi* mission though its popularity within Najd never

really died.[31] With the rise of the second Saudi Emirate, these *Wahhabis* again found the political support they needed and started spreading their mission. Although Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud used *Ikhwan* to reconquer Hijaz, he was more interested in building a stable state than spreading *Wahhabism*.[32] Commins' inquiry into the founding of *Wahhabism* and its subsequent development also points to a rupture between Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings and how they have been employed by later *Wahhabis*. He does so by citing maneuvered translations of Quranic and Hadith literature in school curriculum as examples of how Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings have been decontextualized by later *Wahhabis* for political ends.[33]

Both DeLong-Bas and Commins, however, consider Western modernity and its role in the evolution of Saudi state as the leading cause of the radicalization of the Saudi youth. Both of them argue against equating *Wahhabi* ideology with the fundamentalist notions espoused by al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden had been used in the Afghan war but was left out as he returned to Saudi Arabia and offered to lead war against Iraq. This sense of betrayal coupled with Egyptian *Arabism* promoted by Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Abdu', led bin Laden to rebel and declare war against Saudi regime which would not find sanction in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who had taught obedience to *Emir*.[34] What I want to point out is that contemporary fundamentalism has its roots elsewhere, and the American presence in various locations, including Saudi Arabia, is a significant factor. Commins, for instance, suggests that the Saudi high school textbooks style European presence in Arab lands as crusades in the nineteenth century.[35] This is in continuation of this essay's primary argument that the interaction with the Western modernity shaped Islamic reform of the nineteenth century and later. The earlier reform movements were generally regional and were connected by emphasis on *ijtihad*, not *jihad*. This argument is valid for Deobandi and *Taliban* connection too.

Deobandi, a late nineteenth century reform movement originating in northern India, has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Barbara Metcalf's *Islamic Revival in India: Deoband, 1860-1900*, like John Voll's book, was published in 1982. Metcalf's model is the same as Weismann's, of reading the history of the notables in a colonized society. Metcalf contextualizes the Deobandi movement at the intersections of Shah Wali Allah's legacy and the colonial experience of the Indian Muslims. For her, the defining feature in response to Shah Wali Allah's legacy was the profound sense of loss for Muslims who had ruled India for almost six centuries and had now been languishing as a minority population. This found expression in two widely divergent movements: the jihad movement launched by Shah Ismail and Sayyid Ahmad in early nineteenth century which was crushed by Sikhs in 1831; and the more progressive educational movements like Deoband, Aligarh, and Nadwa that responded to the challenge of modernity through education of the masses and still exist as major Indian universities. Deoband, however, has been the most influential theological institution whose reach has

expanded globally through its *Tablighi* network. The evolution of Deoband is similar to Weismann's characterization of reform movement in Syria in that Deoband was founded by *Sufis* of *Naqshbandi tariqa* who preached *ijtihad* over *jihad*, it steadily shifted away from *Sufi* practices in early twentieth century, and some factions in the movement have been associated with purist *Salafi* movements.

Almost four decades later, Brannon Ingram, in *Revival from Below: The Deobandi Movement and Global Islam* extends Barbara Metcalf's early research into a new paradigm. *Taliban* who found no mention in Metcalf, are central to Ingram's thesis by virtue of the fact that most of their leaders received training in *Deobandi* madrasahs in Pakistan. Ingram problematizes this relationship through the problem of *Sufism* and *Taliban*'s bombing of various *Sufi* shrines in Pakistan. Citing *Sufi* origins of the founders of *Deoband* and their theological position on *Sufis* which endorses that *Sufis* are capable of *Karamat*, Ingram, like Commins, argues that the reformist thoughts do not share any ground with fundamentalist reasoning. By invoking postcolonial affective communities, Ingram rejects Habermasian notion of "the public with its free, rational actors deliberating upon ideas without respect to prior affective commitments"[36] to argue that contemporary religious experience is profoundly political and the ulama who were once an exclusive notable class are now a part of the public everyday. This is further proven by the *Deobandi* experience in apartheid South Africa where its character differs radically from that of *Deobandis* in Pakistan. Ingram, therefore, arrives at the same conclusion that Weismann does in suggesting that the Western modernity de-seated ulama from their position of privilege and the masses turned towards the more localized nationalist politics that aimed at radical decolonization.

This historiography suggests that Islamic reform in the eighteenth century was an intellectual movement that had modernist aims of empowering ordinary Muslims in matters related to faith and everyday life. This liberatory reform was enacted through the promotion of *ijtihad* vis-à-vis *taqlid* or *tamaddhub*. There is a noticeable focus on the textual study of the writings of these reformers to comprehend their projects as they envisioned them. Such a turn in historical analysis has clarified the intent and methods of representative *ulama*. As this historiography suggests, European colonization of the Islamic world changed the trajectory of the reform movements. Similarly, the rise of nation states and post-independence decolonization, as Dallal argues, pose methodological problems in characterization of these reform movements. This historiography also shows that history of Islamic reform constitutes a vibrant discourse community within which historians have often worked in complementary fashion. DeLong-Bas's textual analysis of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings left room for a social history of *Wahhabism* which was filled by Commins immediately. Commins wrote a monograph on the rise of *Salfism* in late Ottoman Syria in 1990[37] which was complemented by Weismann a decade later. Metcalf's monograph was expanded by Ingram

almost four decades later to broaden the scope of the discourse to the ideological foundations of *Taliban*. This historiography is an evidence of a healthy and burgeoning disciplinary niche which would provide models of new historical interventions as there is growing evidence of religion assuming a more pronounced position in national identities across the globe. Just as European modernity altered the course of Islamic reform in the nineteenth century, the neocolonial realities of the world have made religion a more pronounced presence than it has been in the near past. In explicating Islamic reform spread over three centuries, these historians have tended to extend the argument to dissociate reformist thought from contemporary militant organizations like ISIS and *Taliban*. This historiography also shows that, except for Brannon Ingram and Weismann, no historian discussed here has tried to show how popular opinions influenced the reformists, or in other words, how reform worked from the bottom to the top. This methodological shift might yield interesting results as historiography in the field develops further.

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[1] John Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 3.

[2] Voll, Islam, 33.

[3] Natana DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: from Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7

[4] DeLong-Bas frequently cites Stephen Schwartz's widely popular *The Two Faces of Islam* and numerous websites that highlight historically incorrect usage of terms like Wahhabism and Salafism in *Wahhabi Islam*.

[5] Voll, Islam, 356.

[6] Ibid, 29.

[7] Ibid, 30.

[8] Ibid, 282.

[9] Voll, Islam, 350.

[10] Voll is the first name in the acknowledgement section of her book, and she cites him frequently in *Wahhabi Islam*.

[11] He cites H. A. R. Gibb, H. Bowen, Uriel Heyd, P. M. Holt, Ann Lambton, Bernard Lewis, and Ali Merad as the historians who have used Euro-centered approach based on the theory of decline.

[12] Ahmad S. Dallal, *Islam without Europe: Traditions of Reform in the Eighteenth-century Islamic Thought* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018) 4.

[13] Dallal cites Albert Hourani's *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* as an influential work of this kind and devotes significant part of his introduction to a critique of Hourani's thesis.

[14] Dallal, Islam, 15.

[15] Ibid, 220.
[16] Itzchak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden: Brill, 2001) 5.
[17] Ibid, 3.
[18] He cites Voll and aims at filling the gaps in Voll's history through his analysis of Damascus in the nineteenth century. Ibid, 6.
[19] Weismann, Modernity, 305.
[20] Henri Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 16.
[21] Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University press, 2016) 21.
[22] Ibid, 6.
[23] Ibid, 234.
[24] Voll, Islam, 31.
[25] DeLong-Bas claims that lack of access to Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's works was the reason behind much misunderstanding. Her book was, as she claims, based on "unprecedented access" to his writings made possible by the Saudi government. *Wahhabi Islam,* Endnote 8, 291-292.
[26] Qtd. in DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 292. from Stephen Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror.*
[27] DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 8.
[28] Ibid, 106.
[29] Ibid, 221.
[30] DeLong-Bas argues that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab cited Ibn Taymiyya only thrice out of 170 references in his book. She, therefore, questions the validity of claims that Ibn Taymiyya greatly influenced Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings.
[31] David Dean Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006) 43.
[32] Ibid, 72.
[33] Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, 193.
[34] DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 204. 240-279.
[35] Ibid, 201.
[36] Brannon Ingram, Revival from Below: The Deobandi Movement and Global Islam (California: University of California Press, 2018) 212.
[37] David Dean Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)